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[This dissertation examines issues in family demography and the role of public policy 
in shaping life course transitions including educational attainment, marriage, and 
family formation. The first two chapters focus on the Earned Income Tax Credit, one 
of the largest cash transfer programs in the United States. Chapter one analyzes the 
impact of the EITC on the educational attainment of youth from low socioeconomic 
status families. Variation in state EITC policies is used to analyze the impact of 
increased household income on children’s educational attainment. Results suggest that 
a $1,000 increase in state EITC generosity increases college enrollment among 18-23 
year olds by 1 percentage point and increases college enrollment by 0.3 of a 
percentage point, a 10% increase in college completion among this group. Chapter two 
analyzes the marriage penalties associated with the EITC. First, I simulate a marriage 
market to predict the earnings of potential spouses and how a spouse’s earnings impact 
EITC benefits. Multinomial regression models are then used to assess how an 
expected loss in EITC benefits upon marriage affects one’s likelihood of marrying or 
cohabiting. Results suggest that approximately 65% of EITC recipients can expect to 
lose some of their EITC benefits upon marriage. The average EITC recipient can 
expect to lose approximately half of her EITC benefit, or about $1,050. A $1,000 
expected loss in EITC benefits upon marriage is associated with a 1.8 percentage point 
decline in the likelihood of marrying, and a 1.1 percentage point increase in the 
likelihood of cohabiting. Chapter three (co-authored with Kelly Musick) examines 
 variation in family formation among college graduates. We explore differences in the 
rates of childlessness among college-educated women across academic disciplines and 
examine potential mechanisms that may account for such differences. We find that 
women who major in health-related fields have the lowest levels of childlessness at 
around 16% by age 44, while women who major in the arts and humanities have the 
highest rates of childlessness, at 25%. We find that these differences are correlated 
with differences in early marriage patterns among women in these fields, as well as 
traditional gender role attitudes.] 
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 CHAPTER 1 
THE EFFECT OF INCOME ON EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT: EVIDENCE FROM 
STATE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT EXPANSIONS 
 
The gap in college enrollment rates between children growing up in low-income and high-
income households has been well documented in the literature (Bailey and Dynarski 2012; Long 
2008). As of the early 2000s, children growing up in the bottom income quartile were 50 
percentage points less likely to enroll in college compared to children growing up in the highest 
income quartile (Bailey and Dynarski 2012). While some suggest that this gap results from a lack 
of academic preparedness for higher education among the poor (Carneiro and Heckman 2002), 
there also has been evidence that financial constraints play an increasingly important role in 
college enrollment decisions in recent decades (Belley and Lochner 2007). The extent to which 
the cost of college affects college-going among children is much-debated in the literature. There 
is a long literature examining the effects of household income and financial aid programs on 
educational attainment with some studies finding little or no impact of household income on 
college enrollment (Cameron and Taber 2004; Carneiro and Heckman 2002; Hilger 2013), while 
others have found significant increases in college enrollment associated with increases in 
household income (Abraham and Clark 2006; Belley and Lochner 2007; Dynarski 2003; Kane 
2007; Lovenheim 2011). 1These studies focus on the short-run impact of increasing resources 
near the time of college-going, but there is also a long literature pointing to the importance of 
early childhood interventions on later life outcomes (Carneiro and Heckman 2003; Deming 
2009; Chetty et al. 2011).  
1 Kane 1994 finds that while children from low-income households are responsive to the costs of college, 
increasing financial aid policies may not increase college enrollment rates if individuals do not have full 
information about the amount of financial aid available to them. 
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 One potential source of exogenous variation in household income that has received little 
attention in past work is the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). The EITC is the largest cash 
transfer program in the U.S., redistributing over $60 billion dollars to low-income households in 
2010 (Tax Policy Center 2013). The EITC is designed to subsidize low-wage work, with recent 
estimates suggesting that the EITC helped lift 3.1 million children out of poverty in 2011 (Center 
on Budget and Policy Priorities 2011). The EITC is a particularly interesting income intervention 
program because it potentially affects college-going through multiple pathways: by increasing 
household resources both during early childhood and around the time of college-going. While 
most families that receive the EITC have young children, the EITC also incentivizes college-
going by providing conditional cash transfers to older children--those who are full-time students 
between the ages of 19 and 23. While there have been numerous studies exploring how the EITC 
affects low-income households (see Hotz and Scholz (2003) or Meyer (2010) for a review), there 
has only recently been a focus on the effects of the EITC on the children of EITC recipients (e.g. 
Dahl and Lochner (2012); Hoynes, Miller, and Simon (2012)). 
This paper examines the effect of the EITC on the educational attainment of children of 
EITC recipients, making three primary contributions to the literature. First, this paper adds to the 
literature on the impacts of the EITC on children of EITC recipients. Given the size of this 
program, its impact on educational attainment is policy interest in its own right. By using 
variation in state EITC generosity, this is the first analysis to estimate both the short-run impact 
on college investment of the EITC as a conditional cash transfer to college-aged children and the 
long-run impact of the EITC as an early childhood income intervention. Second, this work 
contributes to the literature on the effects of household resources on college enrollment by 
exploiting a new source of exogenous variation: expansions of state EITC benefits. Third, this 
paper provides direct evidence on when in a child's life income shocks matter the most for 
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 educational attainment by examining the effects of EITC expansions for younger versus older 
children.  
In this paper, I use a difference-in-differences analysis with variation in treatment dosage 
to evaluate the impact of changes in state EITC benefits on the educational attainment of 
disadvantaged youth. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, several states implemented their own 
EITCs that piggy-back off of the federal EITC. As of the 2012 tax year, 23 states and the District 
of Columbia offered some form of a state EITC. For the vast majority of these state credits, 
federal eligibility determines state eligibility and credits are typically a fixed percent of the 
federal benefit, ranging from 3--45 percent. Many states also changed the generosity of their 
benefits over time, providing variation in both the timing of implementation and the timing of 
state EITC benefit level changes. I estimate the impact of increases in household income on 
college enrollment by comparing outcomes of individuals before and after changes in state EITC 
benefits to those of children living in states that do not experience changes in EITC benefits. 
These control states are predominantly those that never implement a state-level EITC, but they 
may not be adequate counterfactuals if EITC-implementing states experience secular increases in 
educational attainment for all children.2 To address this concern, I also use a triple-difference 
strategy comparing changes in outcomes of children of likely EITC-recipients to educational 
trends of children from more affluent households within the same state, relative to changes in 
outcomes of children living in states that never implement EITCs. Outcomes of interest include 
high school completion rates, years of completed schooling, college enrollment, and college 
completion. Variation in the timing of state EITC expansions also will allow for evaluation of 
how effects vary based on the length of time an individual is exposed to a state EITC. If the 
EITC increases educational attainment by providing a conditional cash transfer to college-aged 
2 In years when states do not change EITC generosity, those states contribute to the identification of year 
effects, even if they have implemented state-level EITCs. 
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 individuals, we would expect the effect size to be independent of the length of time one is 
exposed to a state EITC, so long as there is a state benefit while the child is in college. If instead, 
the EITC increases educational attainment by providing extra income to households with young 
children, thus alleviating long-run credit constraints, we would expect effects to increase with 
length of exposure to state EITCs. 
To conduct this analysis, I use data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP), pooling panels from 1990 through 2008. I focus on 18--23 year olds for this analysis, 
using parental educational attainment as a proxy for EITC-eligibility. Individuals living with 
parents that have no schooling beyond a high school degree will be considered EITC-eligible, 
while all others will be considered non-eligible.3 Results are quite similar when actual eligibility 
is used instead of parents' education, discussed in the robustness checks section IV.C, below} 
This results in a lower-bound estimate, since some of the `non-eligible' individuals may have 
indeed received the EITC as children. Results using only the EITC-eligible sample can be 
thought of as an upper bound estimate since they do not control for state-specific secular trends 
in educational attainment other than time-invariant state-level effects. 
My results indicate that following a $1,000 increase in EITC benefits, 18--23 year old 
children from low-educated households are more likely to complete high school (2 percentage 
points on a base of 70 percent), have more years of schooling (0.11 of a year on a base of 11.97 
years), are more likely to have ever enrolled in college (2.5 percentage points on a base of 41 
percent), and are more likely to complete a bachelor's degree (0.7 of a percentage point on a base 
of 3 percent). Controlling for state-specific trends in educational outcomes using children from 
highly-educated households yields smaller, but more precisely-estimated positive results. 
Compared to children growing up in highly-educated households, a $1,000 increase in the 
3 Education is often used in the EITC literature to proxy for eligibility, due to concerns of potential 
endogeneity of benefit-claiming and income levels to the outcomes of interest (Baker 2008; Baughman 
and Dickert-Conlin 2009; Meyer 2010; Celik 2011). 
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 maximum federal and state EITC benefit increases college enrollment among children from low-
educated households by 0.7 percentage points (on a base of 26 percent), and increases the 
likelihood of having a bachelor's degree by 0.3 percentage points (on a base of 3 percent). I find 
that these effects are much larger for children who were younger than 12 years old at the time 
their state implemented an EITC. I also find no effect of EITC expansions on children who were 
college-aged at the time of implementation, for whom the EITC acts as a form of financial aid. 
This finding suggests that the EITC increases college enrollment primarily by providing income 
transfers to households with young children, allowing children to benefit from several years of 
increased household income. These results support previous work emphasizing the importance of 
early childhood investments for later life outcomes (e.g. Carneiro and Heckman (2003); Duncan, 
Ludwig, and Magnuson (2007) Chetty et al. (2011)). 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section I, I discuss the structure of the EITC and 
how it might affect education outcomes. Section II describes the data, Section III discusses the 
empirical strategy, and Section IV contains results. Section V concludes. 
I. EITC Background 
Since its inception in the 1970s, the EITC has undergone several expansions at both the federal 
and state level. As of the 2012 tax year, the EITC provided a benefit worth up to 45 percent of 
earnings for households with three or more children. It is also fully refundable, so households 
with no tax liability receive the EITC benefit as a refund. In addition to the federal benefit, 23 
states and the District of Columbia have their own EITCs, which increase the total benefit by 3-
45 percent of the federal benefit. States implemented their own EITCs beginning in the late 
1980s, but the majority implemented credits in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Table 1 shows a 
list of states that have ever implemented EITCs, the year of implementation, the benefit level at 
the time of implementation, and the benefit level as of the 2011 tax year.  
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 While there is quite a bit of variation in the timing of implementation of state EITCs, 
several states also change their benefit level over time. For instance, New York implemented an 
EITC in 1994 worth just 7.5 percent of the federal EITC. As of the 2011 tax year, New York had 
increased the value of its EITC to 30 percent of the federal EITC. Other states have reduced or 
eliminated their EITCs. Colorado, for instance, had an 8.5 percent EITC in 1999 but suspended it 
in 2003 due to lack of funding.  
Pooling all states that implemented EITCs, Figure 1 shows the average maximum 
combined federal and state EITC benefit in thousands of (2011) dollars over time since state 
EITC implementation. Before states implemented EITCs, the maximum federal EITC and the 
combined federal and state EITC were one and the same and grew only due to real changes in the 
federal maximum benefit. When the average state in the sample implemented its EITC, the 
maximum federal EITC benefit was approximately $4,000. Fifteen years after implementation, 
the average maximum federal and state EITC had grown to nearly $7,000 in real terms, while the 
maximum federal EITC alone was worth approximately $5,000 in year 2011 dollars.  
The EITC is calculated based on the earnings of the head of household and spouse (if 
married) and the number of children living in the household. The EITC benefit structure has 
three segments: a phase-in region, where benefits increase as earnings increase; a plateau region, 
where benefits do not change with increases in earnings; and a phase-out region, where benefits 
decrease for every extra dollar earned. The steepness of the phase-in and phase-out segments 
depends on the number of children living in the household. For a household with two children, 
the slope of the phase-in region is 0.40, so every dollar of earnings increases the EITC benefit by 
40 cents. Once earnings reach a certain threshold, the EITC benefit is constant until earnings 
reach a second threshold, at which point benefits are phased out at a rate of 21 cents per dollar 
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 for a household with two children. Figure 2 illustrates the structure of the federal EITC for the 
2011 tax year.  
While there is a small benefit for households with no children, households with children 
represent 77 percent of EITC claims and over 97 percent of dollars spent on the EITC (Tax 
Policy Center 2012). A family can claim up to two (three for tax years 2009 and beyond) 
qualifying children on their tax forms. Qualifying children are defined as related children under 
the age of 19 that live in the household for at least 6 months of the year. Children over the age of 
18 are also eligible up until age 24 if they are full-time students for at least 5 months of the year.4 
Because the benefit is contingent upon full-time enrollment, the EITC can be thought of as a 
form of financial aid. While maximum EITC benefits are over $5,000 for households with two or 
more children, childless individuals are eligible for less than $500 as of the 2011 tax year. A 
couple earning $20,000 in 2011 would be eligible for the maximum benefit of $3,094 claiming 
one child but would be ineligible for any EITC benefit without a dependent. If that family lived 
in a state that supplemented the federal EITC, they could earn up to an additional $1,392, 
bringing the total gain in EITC benefits to $4,486 (2011$) for each year their child remained in 
school after age 18. With the addition of other types of financial aid that this family would likely 
qualify for, these benefits could help finance their child's higher education.5 
I.A The EITC and Educational Attainment 
There is some literature that suggests that low-income children do not attend college at the same 
rate as high-income children not because of short-term financial constraints, but because they 
4 Children living away at school are considered living in the household during those months and may be 
claimed as dependents. `Full-time' status is defined by the institution. Students can be enrolled in any type 
of academic institution; secondary, or post-secondary (Internal Revenue Service 2012).} 
5 Net costs of a public four-year institution for the 2007-08 school year was $10,000 for individuals in 
households that earned less than $32,500 in 2006. Net costs of a public two-year institution for the 2007-
08 school year was $6,000 for individuals in households that earned less than $32,500. Net costs reflects 
tuition, room and board, and other costs, subtracting grant and loan aid. Net costs do not take into account 
tax credits or deductions (College Board 2012). 
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 lack sufficient academic preparation to attend college (Carneiro and Heckman 2002; Cameron 
and Taber 2004). Carneiro and Heckman (2002) argue that obtaining loans to pay for college in 
the short-run is relatively easy, but rather the so-called ‘long-term’ credit constraints--the 
inability of parents to borrow against their children's future earnings to pay for better schooling 
throughout their children's lives--are what limits college enrollment among low-income 
households. They argue that gaps in academic preparedness, not financial aid, are what accounts 
for the majority of the gap in college enrollment rates between individuals from high-income 
backgrounds and those from low-income backgrounds. More recent evidence, however, has 
shown that gaps in college enrollment rates remain even after controlling for ability differences 
between low-income and high-income households (Belley and Lochner 2007), suggesting that 
short-run financial constraints are playing an increasingly important role in college enrollment 
decisions. The EITC could help alleviate both of these types of constraints by providing short-
run financial aid for children during the college-going years and by providing extra income to 
low-income households with young children, improving the quality of schooling children receive 
throughout their lives. 
There are several features of the EITC that make it a potentially important program for 
increasing the educational attainment of low-income youth. The EITC is a substantial credit, 
worth nearly $6,000 in 2012 for households that earned between $13,000 and $22,300. Unlike 
traditional welfare programs, there is no lifetime limit to the number of years households can 
claim the EITC. Because families tend to claim the EITC for consecutive years, state and federal 
policies that increase the maximum EITC may produce several years of higher household income 
for low socioeconomic status households.6 Children of EITC recipients may benefit from several 
years of increased income throughout their childhoods, and these benefits may improve their 
6 The average family that is ever eligible for the EITC will typically claim it for 3 years (Ackerman, 
Holtzblatt and Masken 2009). 
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 quality of schooling or the quality and quantity of parental investments in them, thus increasing 
the likelihood of completing high school and enrolling in college. Several studies have analyzed 
the types of purchases made with EITC benefits, suggesting that many recipients use the money 
to pay down debt (Smeeding et al. 2002; Tach and Halpern-Meekin 2013), save money for their 
children (Tach and Halpern-Meekin 2013), and make other purchases to generally improve their 
social standing (Smeeding et al. 2002). This evidence is consistent with EITC payments being 
used to invest more in children. 
There has been some evidence suggesting that the EITC increases contemporaneous test 
scores of children aged 5 to 15 (Dahl and Lochner 2012). Using a federal expansion of the EITC 
for two-child households, this study shows that a $1,000 increase in benefits increased math and 
reading test scores on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) by 6 percent of 
a standard deviation. While these effects suggest that the EITC does have a positive impact on 
the outcomes of children of EITC recipients, it is not clear whether these effects persist, and 
whether these test score gains lead to gains in long-run educational attainment. Many policy 
interventions that improve the short-run test scores of children have been shown to fade out 
quickly after the intervention (Currie and Thomas 2000; Kane and Staiger 2008; Jacob, Lefgrin, 
and Sims 2010), although effects on longer-term outcomes such as high school graduation and 
college enrollment have been found years after an intervention has ended (Krueger and 
Whitmore 2001; Ludwig and Miller 2007; Deming 2009; Chetty et al. 2011), increasing the need 
for further research to assess whether the test score gains from the EITC translate into 
improvements in longer-term outcomes.  
In addition to providing extra income to households with young children, claiming rules 
for dependent children create direct financial incentives for families to send their children to 
college. The EITC requires that in order to claim a child as a dependent, she must be under the 
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 age of 18 at the end of the year or be under the age of 24 and a full-time student. Since there is a 
very small benefit available to households with no children, this conditional cash transfer 
provides a strong incentive for EITC-eligible households to encourage their children to go to 
college. The EITC has an additional advantage over traditional forms of financial aid in that it 
does not require the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) to determine eligibility, 
and income from the EITC is not included in calculations for financial aid eligibility.7 Recent 
research on the FAFSA suggests that its complexity serves as a significant barrier to college 
enrollment and that simplifying the application would increase the probability that a low-income 
child attends college (Dynarski and Scott-Clayton 2006; Dynarski and Scott-Clayton 2008; 
Bettinger et al. 2012). The EITC, on the other hand, requires only an additional sheet to attach to 
the federal 1040 tax form.8  Perhaps because the EITC is easy to claim, and many low-income 
taxpayers utilize free services or professional tax preparers to complete their taxes, the EITC has 
a fairly high participation rate compared to other welfare programs, at over 80 percent of eligible 
taxpayers (Chetty, Friedman, and Saez 2012). 
The conditional cash transfer aspect of the EITC is quite similar to the Social Security 
Student Benefits Program (from here on referred to as SSBP) that provided financial aid to 
college students of retired or deceased parents. Previous research suggests that the SSBP 
increased college enrollment among children with deceased fathers by 3.5 percentage points for 
every $1,000 of aid (Dynarski 2003). While the program provided generous benefits to 
qualifying individuals, Dynarski (2003) shows that at its peak, only 12 percent of full-time 
7 Most EITC-eligible households would have 0 expected family contributions from the FAFSA and would 
likely be eligible for many federal grants and loans. Though take up of financial aid is not 100 percent, it 
is not clear that small increases in EITC generosity would necessarily generate large, short-run increases 
in college enrollment since many EITC-eligible families would have access to many other forms of 
financial aid. 
8 The federal tax code already provides financial aid to college students through the Hope Tax Credit and 
the Lifetime Learning Credit, which are worth around $2,000 in non-refundable credits. Long (2004) 
shows that because these credits are non-refundable, they are more likely to help middle-income 
households and households where individuals would have attended college regardless of the credit. 
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 college students received the benefit, and only 5 percent of all children experienced the death of 
their father before age 18. The EITC presents a similar type of cash transfer as the SSBP, 
providing conditional cash transfers through the tax code for students up until age 24. Compared 
to the SSBP, the EITC is likely to reach a much larger group of children, with some recent 
evidence suggesting that half of households with children will claim the EITC at some point over 
an 18-year period (Horowitz and Dowd 2011). This analysis also provides a more recent picture 
of how college enrollment of low-income children is affected by changes in household income.9 
Several other studies have found positive effects of household resources on college 
enrollment, using a variety of definitions of income to assess the impact on college enrollment. 
Recent studies have used variations in state-specific scholarship programs (Dynarksi 2000; 
Abraham and Clark 2006; Kane 2007}, housing wealth (Lovenheim 2011), and federal 
regulations concerning drug offenders and eligibility for federal financial aid (Lovenheim and 
Owens 2013) to examine the impact of income on college enrollment, all finding significant, 
positive effects of income on college enrollment.  
In a recent study by Manoli and Turner (2014), the authors exploit variation in income 
generated by kinks in the EITC benefit structure to analyze the impact of an increase in income 
during one's senior year of high school on college enrollment the following fall. The authors find 
a 2-3 percentage point increase in college enrollment associated with a $1,000 increase in 
household income. This strategy of comparing EITC-recipients just above and below the kink 
point estimates the effect of an increase in income on college enrollment, but does not capture 
the total effect of the EITC on college enrollment. In addition to providing extra household 
income just prior to college-going, the EITC may also increase college enrollment by providing 
resources to households with young children. Further, the rules regarding qualifying children 
9 The SSBP has not been in existence for more than 30 years, and more recent evidence suggests that 
financial constraints are playing an increasingly important role in college-going decisions for low-income 
households (Belley and Lochner 2007). 
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 increase the incentives for low-income families to keep their 19--23 year old children in school, 
the effect of which cannot be directly evaluated in Manoli and Turner (2014). My analysis is the 
first to estimate both the short-run impact of the EITC (increases in income around college-going 
age) and the long-run impact (being exposed to a larger EITC throughout childhood) on 
subsequent college-going. 
II. Data 
The data I use in this analysis come from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) 
panels from 1990 through 2008 and the Current Population Survey March Supplement (CPS) 
from 1992-2011.  
II.A Survey of Income and Program Participation 
The SIPP is a nationally-representative household survey that follows households for up to 48 
months and interviews each household member about their employment, educational attainment, 
and income sources. The data I use for this analysis come from pooling eight different surveys 
from 1990--2008, which cover the years between 1990--2011. Each survey follows households 
for at least 32 months, with some surveys following households up to 48 months. The short panel 
nature of the SIPP allows one to observe individuals living in the household in the first month of 
the interview and follow them throughout the survey, even if they later leave the household. 
Individuals living away from the household for schooling are considered living in the household 
with their parents. Using the SIPP data, I examine the educational attainment of 18-23 year olds 
who were living with their parents in the first month of the interview, evaluating their 
educational attainment in each March of the survey, to coincide with the observation month of 
the CPS March Supplement. Outcomes of interest include current and past college enrollment, 
years of schooling, and completion of various degrees: high school, associate's and bachelor's 
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 degrees. Restricting the sample to 18--23 year olds living with a parent in the first month of the 
survey produces a sample of 81,724 person-year observations (25,337 unique individuals).  
I next proxy for EITC-eligibility using parents' education. Specifically, I consider the 
sample of 18--23 year olds who live in households where neither parent in the household has 
schooling beyond a high school degree, a sample of 31,130 observations. Because I can only 
observe 3 to 4 years of family income using the SIPP, I can only assess actual EITC-eligibility 
when individuals are 18--23 years old, but the EITC tends to go to families with younger 
children (Ackerman, Holtzblatt, Masken 2009). By using actual EITC-eligibility for 18--23 year 
olds, I may be capturing a particularly disadvantaged group of individuals. Additionally, many 
18--23 year olds that are not living in EITC-eligible households may very well have received the 
EITC as young children. Because of this, as well as concerns of endogeneity of eligibility to 
education outcomes, I prefer to use parents’ education as a proxy for eligibility, which is likely a 
better indicator for childhood EITC-eligibility.10 I refer to this group as the ‘high-impact’ 
sample. As a robustness check, some analyses were also conducted using actual EITC eligibility 
in the first year of the SIPP survey. Results are discussed in Section IV.C below, and are 
qualitatively quite similar to results generated when using parental education as a proxy for 
EITC-eligibility. 
While this strategy of matching children to their parents in the first month of the survey 
allows me to capture approximately 70 percent of the sample of 18--23 year olds living with a 
parent, the individuals not observed living with a parent are unlikely to be a random sample. 
Children who do not enroll in college right after high school are less likely to live with their 
parents, so focusing on individuals who live at home may over-represent individuals enrolled in 
school. As this is more of a concern among the older individuals in the sample, I also conduct 
10 Approximately 55 percent of individuals living with parents that had no schooling beyond a high school 
degree were eligible for the EITC in at least one year of the SIPP survey, as determined by household 
income and the number of children in the household. 
 13 
                                                 
 additional analyses restricting the sample to 18--20 year olds. Restricting the sample to this 
narrower age range allows me to observe approximately 85 percent of 18--20 year olds in the 
SIPP.11 
While the SIPP survey allows for observation of individuals over time, even if they leave 
the household, the survey also has limitations. Prior to the 2004 survey, the SIPP did not have 
individual state identifiers for a few states. Though most of the states without individual 
identifiers were quite small in population (e.g. Vermont and Maine), this may pose an issue in 
determining who is treated by a state EITC.12 
II. B. Current Population Survey 
To ensure that the results are not unique to the sampling design of the SIPP, I also use the CPS 
March Supplement. The CPS provides a much larger sample of 18--20 year olds than the SIPP---
roughly six times the number of unique individuals aged 18--20 in the SIPP. The CPS March 
Supplement is a cross-sectional, nationally-representative household survey that collects 
information on annual earnings from the prior calendar year. It also collects information on 
demographic characteristics such as race, educational attainment and enrollment at the time of 
survey. Everyone currently living in the household is surveyed, as are individuals who usually 
live in the household but are currently living away for school. In contrast to the SIPP, which 
follows households over time, the CPS March Supplement observes households only once, so 
11 Differences between individuals living with a parent in the beginning of the survey and those not living 
with a parent can be found in Appendix Table 1. In results not shown, but available upon request, there 
was little evidence that the likelihood of being in the sample of individuals living with at least one parent 
changed as a function of state EITC generosity. 
12 Prior to the 2004 survey, for instance, one could not distinguish between residents living in North 
Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, or in some years, Iowa; while individuals living in Maine and Vermont 
were also indisguishable. North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming never implement state EITCs 
during this time period, so all individuals residing in those states serve as part of the control group. Maine 
and Vermont both have EITCs, and they were established at different points in time and are of different 
generosity levels. Because of this, I exclude individuals who lived in either Maine or Vermont for the 
survey years prior to 2004. The number of individuals living in Maine and Vermont in those years was 
quite small, and is unlikely to substantially impact the results. 
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 individuals must be living with at least one parent at the time of interview in order to observe 
parental education. Like the SIPP, this creates concerns regarding those who are not living at 
home, which is a bigger issue in the CPS since individuals are only observed at one point in time. 
Because of this concern about selection into who lives with a parent, I restrict my analysis to 
individuals 18--20 years old at the time of the survey---a sample of 97,123 individuals, 36,063 of 
whom are in the high impact sample. By restricting the analysis to individuals aged 18--20 who 
live with at least one parent, I observe approximately 70 percent of the sample of all 18--20 year 
olds in the CPS.  
II. C. Summary Statistics 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the sample of 18--23 year olds in the SIPP living with at 
least one parent at the start of the survey in the high-impact sample. I present summary statistics 
for individuals living in states that never implement EITCs and states that do implement EITCs, 
separately analyzing the years before and after implementation for the states that implement 
EITCs. The last column shows the change in characteristics before and after state EITC 
implementation compared to individuals living in states that never implement EITCs.  
Before implementing EITCs, individuals living in states that eventually implement EITCs 
have better schooling than individuals living in states that never implement EITCs. They are 
about 3 percentage points more likely to be currently enrolled in college (26 percent compared to 
23 percent), have about 0.10 more years of schooling, and are about 4 percentage points more 
likely to have ever enrolled in college. They are also 4 percentage points more likely to have 
completed a high school degree. Comparing the changes in characteristics before and after 
changes in state EITC implementation to states that never implement EITCs (last column), 
individuals living in states with EITCs are about 5 percentage points more likely to be currently 
enrolled in college after the implementation compared to individuals living in states that never 
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 implement EITCs. They also have 0.19 more years of schooling, are 5 percentage points more 
likely to have ever enrolled in college, and are about 1 percentage point more likely to have a 
bachelor's degree.  
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics in the same format as Table 2 for the other samples of 
interest: the 18--20 year olds from the SIPP and the 18--20 year olds from the CPS. Changes in 
the outcome variables of interest are very similar among the 18--20 year olds in the SIPP 
compared to the 18--23 year olds. For the 18--20 year old SIPP sample, there is a 5 percentage 
point increase in college enrollment after states implement EITCs, compared to individuals who 
live in states that never implement EITCs. There is no change in the number of years of 
schooling or the likelihood of having a high school degree. Somewhat larger results are shown 
using the CPS. After implementing an EITC, individuals in the CPS are 7.5 percentage points 
more likely to be currently enrolled in college, have about 0.19 years of schooling, are 5 
percentage points more likely to have completed high school, and are 7.5 percentage points more 
likely to have ever enrolled in college, compared to individuals living in states that never 
implement EITCs. The larger effects in the CPS could be due to larger sample sizes than the 
SIPP and thus more precise estimates, or they could be due to potential sample selection where 
18--20 year olds in the CPS are more likely to be living at home if they are enrolled in college. 
While Table 2 and 3 indicate that state EITC implementation is positively associated with 
educational attainment, other demographic characteristics change as well. The share of blacks in 
the 18--23 year old sample declines dramatically following state EITC implementations, and the 
share of women in the sample increases. The increases in educational attainment observed may 
be spurious if sample characteristics change at the same time as changes to the EITC. To test 
whether the demographic characteristics change as a function of changes in the state EITC 
benefit, I separately regress each demographic control on the maximum federal and state EITC in 
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 a given state and year controlling for state and year fixed effects. Results can be found in 
Appendix Table 2. Each cell represents a separate regression, and the coefficients displayed 
illustrate the effect of a $1,000 increase in the maximum federal and state EITC on each 
demographic control. The first three columns use only the high-impact sample, while the second 
three columns use children from the low-impact sample to test whether the changes in 
demographic controls occur differentially for the high-impact sample compared to the rest of the 
population. Once including state and year fixed effects, very few of the demographic controls 
appear to change as a function of the EITC in either the high-impact sample or in the triple-
difference analysis, alleviating some concern that changes in education outcomes are driven by 
changes in the composition of the sample. However, in the triple-difference analysis children in 
the high-impact sample are significantly less likely to live in two-parent households when the 
EITC increases by $1,000, indicating that the EITC may discourage marriage among the low-
educated population. 13 For all other demographic controls, the triple-difference analysis 
confirms that, once adjusting for state and year fixed effects, there is very little change in 
observable characteristics associated with changes in the EITC. 
III. Empirical Method 
To analyze how the EITC affects the educational attainment of children from low-educated 
families, I employ a series of difference-in-differences estimators that examine the changes in 
high school graduation rates, years of schooling, college enrollment, and degree completion 
following changes in state EITC benefits. I create a treatment variable equal to the maximum 
combined federal and state EITC that a household with two children could receive in a given 
13 The relationship between the EITC and marriage has been examined, although there is little evidence 
that the EITC significantly alters marriage behavior, see Dickert-Conlin and Houser 2002. 
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 state and year.14 All individuals in the analysis are assigned this value, which can be thought of 
as the maximum potential EITC benefit for an individual living in a given state in a particular 
year. For instance, in the 2011 tax year, the maximum federal EITC for a household with two 
children was $5,112. Individuals living in Washington, DC for the 2011 tax year also were 
eligible for an additional $2,045 (DC had an EITC worth 40 percent of the federal EITC in 
2011), so the maximum combined federal and state EITC for a household with two or more 
children was $7,157 in Washington, DC in 2011. All values were then adjusted for inflation and 
reported in year 2011 dollars, using the consumer price index. 
I begin by examining the effects of the maximum federal and state EITC on individuals 
in the high-impact sample only, comparing outcomes of individuals living in states after an 
increase in the EITC by $1,000 to outcomes of individuals who lived in states before the increase 
occurred, relative to changes in outcomes among individuals in the untreated states and years. 
Using linear regression models, I estimate equations of the following form: 
 
 
where i indexes individuals, s indexes states, and t indexes years. Yi,s,t  is the outcome variable of 
interest: college enrollment, high school completion, years of schooling, and degree completion. 
As discussed above, EITCs,t is the maximum federal and state combined EITC benefit in a given 
state and year for a household with two children, in thousands of dollars. The coefficient on this 
term identifies within-state changes in the outcome variables of interest associated with a $1,000 
change in the state EITC benefit. Xi,s,t is a vector of 
14 I use the maximum benefits for a two-child household rather than the maximum benefit for the actual 
number of children in a particular household to avoid issues of endogeneity of family structure to EITC 
policy changes. 
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 personal characteristics that includes age, race, gender, number of male and female siblings 
living in the household, how many times the respondent appears in the sample (up to 4), and 
whether both parents are living in the household. Vs,t includes state-by-year economic indicators, 
including the minimum wage and the unemployment rate. Zs and Wt are state and year fixed 
effects, respectively. State fixed effects control for time-invariant state-level characteristics, such 
as political ideology. Year fixed effects control for changes that affect all states, such as the 
federal unemployment rate or expansions to the federal EITC.15 Both of these fixed effects are 
identified because not all states implement or change EITCs at the same time. 
States that never implement EITCs may not be an adequate comparison group for states 
with their own EITC benefits. While there is considerable variation in the timing of state EITC 
changes, there may be other changes in state-level policies that occur at the same time as changes 
to state EITCs that affect all college-aged individuals, which would confound the effects of the 
EITC on educational attainment. For instance, Table 2 indicated that the share of women in the 
EITC-implementing states increased following state EITC implementation. If there are secular 
increases in female college enrollment in states that have EITCs, comparing outcomes of 
individuals in states that have EITCs to outcomes of individuals in states that do not have EITCs 
may generate a spurious association between the EITC and education outcomes. State fixed 
effects do not adequately address this concern because they only control for time-invariant 
characteristics particular to each state. In another set of analyses, I use a series of triple 
difference models to provide a different counterfactual for EITC-eligible children in states that 
implement EITCs. In this set of analyses, I include all individuals, regardless of their parents' 
educational attainment, and compare the outcomes of children in the high-impact sample to those 
of children not likely to be affected by changes in the EITC---those living in highly-educated 
15 The federal EITC was expanded for two-child households gradually from 1991 to 1996. 
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 households. This model will take a very similar form to (1), but will include individuals from the 
low-impact sample to control for other state-level trends in education outcomes. This model will 
include an indicator for whether the respondent is in the high-impact sample, as well as an 
interaction of the maximum EITC with whether the respondent is in the high-impact sample:  
 
 
(2) 
where ELGi,s,t  is equal to one if the individual lives in a household where neither parent has 
schooling beyond a high school degree, and zero otherwise. β3 represents the key independent 
variable of interest: the difference in the outcome variable between children in the high-impact 
sample (those with low-educated parents) and the low-impact sample (those with highly-
educated parents) associated with a $1,000 increase in potential EITC benefits. It is worth noting 
that some individuals in the low-impact sample did live in households where their annual income 
placed them in the EITC-eligibility range, so some of these individuals may have actually 
received the EITC.16 Estimates from these regressions may be thought of as a lower-bound, as 
some individuals in the comparison group may also benefit from the credit. 
To address concerns that secular trends in educational attainment among individuals 
living in states that have EITCs may cause spurious associations between EITC changes and 
educational attainment, Figure 3 plots an event study of the effect of the maximum federal and 
state EITC on changes in the outcomes of interest for the years leading up to, and following the 
state EITC implementation. The coefficient plotted is the triple-interaction of the maximum 
federal and state EITC benefit with an indicator for being in the high-impact sample, for each 
16 Approximately twenty percent of the sample of individuals in the low-impact sample were eligible for 
the EITC as determined by their household income and the number of children residing in the household. 
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 year before and after implementation. Following state EITC implementation, interacting the 
maximum federal and state EITC with time-since-implementation indicators illustrates the 
effects of within-state changes in the generosity of EITC benefits on changes in the outcome 
variables for each year since implementation. Each graph represents a separate regression---one 
for each outcome of interest. All regressions include the triple-interaction of EITC eligibility, 
EITC generosity, and years since implementation, along with demographic controls, state fixed 
effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. The lighter gray 
bars represent the 95% confidence intervals. Each graph is limited to the 10 years before and 
after state EITC implementation, as there are few states that have more than 10 years of either a 
pre- or post-implementation window. The year before implementation is omitted as the reference 
category. The graphs show little evidence of pre-trends in any of the outcomes of interest as a 
function of EITC generosity, although confidence intervals are quite large and often do not rule 
out effects of zero post-implementation.17 
While I find little evidence of pre-existing trends in education outcomes leading up to 
state EITC implementation, there may be other state-specific events that occur at the same time 
as changes in state EITC generosity. For instance, if states are more likely to increase their EITC 
benefits when the unemployment rate is high and high unemployment also induces more 
individuals to enroll in college, changes in education outcomes will reflect not only the effect of 
a change in state EITC benefits, but also the effect of high unemployment on educational 
attainment. To test whether state EITCs are correlated with other macroeconomic indicators, I 
regress the maximum federal and state EITC on other state characteristics such as state-by-year 
GDP, minimum wage, unemployment rate, welfare generosity, and state spending on higher 
17 I have also conducted an event-study analysis using the CPS, which provides a larger sample size and 
more precision in estimating time trends. An analogous Figure 3 for the CPS can be found in Appendix 
Figure 1. Results look quite similar to those found in the SIPP, but suggest significant increases in the 
outcomes of interest in the years following state EITC implementation. 
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 education. Results (shown in Table 4) suggest little correlation between the generosity of state 
EITC benefits and other state indicators. 
 
 
 
IV. Results 
Table 5 shows results from models (1) and (2) for each outcome variable of interest. Education 
outcomes are evaluated as a function of the maximum federal and state EITC in a given year and 
state. The top panel presents the coefficient β from (1), while the bottom panel presents the 
coefficient on the interaction term β3 from (2). The coefficient can be interpreted as the change in 
the outcome variable of interest associated with a $1,000 increase in the maximum federal and 
state EITC benefit. All models include state and year fixed effects. The first column shows 
results with no other demographic controls, while the second column adds demographic 
characteristics. Standard errors are clustered at the state level, allowing for correlation of the 
error term for individuals living in the same state. From left to right, the first panel shows results 
for the 18--23 year olds in the SIPP, the second panel shows results for 18--20 year olds in the 
SIPP, and the third panel shows results for 18--20 year olds in the CPS. 
Results from the top panel indicate that current and past college enrollment rates 
increased among 18--23 year olds in the high-impact sample as the maximum EITC benefit 
increased, as did years of schooling, and high school graduation rates. None of these effects is 
statistically significant without the demographic controls (column 1), but effects on years of 
schooling, high school graduation, and the likelihood of ever enrolling in college all increase and 
become statistically significant once demographic controls are included in column 2. After 
including demographic controls (column 2), 18--23 year olds are 6 percent more likely to be 
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 enrolled in college (a 1.5 percentage point increase on a base of 26 percent) and 7 percent more 
likely to have ever enrolled in college (2.7 percentage point increase on a base of 41 percent). 
Smaller effects can be seen for years of schooling, which increased by 1 percent (0.11 of a year 
increase on a base of 11.97 years), and high school completion, which increased by 3 percent 
(2.3 percentage point gain on a base of 70 percent). The results for college enrollment are smaller 
than effects found elsewhere in the literature (Dynarski 2003, Abraham and Clark 2006) which 
suggest that a $1,000 increase in financial aid is associated with a 3 percentage point increase in 
college enrollment. The results presented here are about half that size, but a 95% confidence 
interval includes a 4 percentage point increase in current college enrollment among 18--23 year 
olds following an increase in the EITC of $1,000. Further, my sample focuses on a group that is 
likely to be eligible for a lot of financial aid and therefore may be less responsive to short-run 
changes in household income. 
Effects are slightly smaller but less precisely estimated for the samples of 18--20 year 
olds in the SIPP and the CPS. Results from regressions including demographic controls along 
with state and year fixed effects for the 18--20 year olds suggest that individuals are 1.7 
percentage points more likely to be currently enrolled in college and are 2.7 percentage points 
more likely to have ever enrolled in college. These effects represent a 6-7% increase in college 
enrollment among the high-impact sample. For the CPS results, I find no significant effects of 
the EITC on education outcomes, though point estimates are quite similar to those in the SIPP.  
Results from the top panel of Table 5 indicate that individuals who live in states with 
EITCs are more likely to finish high school and go on to college. While these effects could be 
due to the changes in the EITC, it is also possible that other state-specific changes may be 
occurring at the same time as changes in the EITC that affect all teens. To control for other state-
specific factors, I next include all of the individuals living with at least one parent in the 
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 beginning of the survey, regardless of the education of their parents. Individuals who live in 
households with at least one parent who has any college experience are less likely to receive the 
EITC and should therefore be less affected by changes in the value of the state EITC. Including 
these individuals in the analysis controls for other trends that may be occurring in states at the 
same time as changes in the EITC.  
The coefficient presented in the bottom panel of Table 5 is β3 from (2). It represents the 
change in the outcome variable of interest associated with a $1,000 increase in the combined 
federal and state EITC for individuals in the high-impact sample, compared to those in the low-
impact sample and to those who never experience a $1,000 increase in the EITC. Including the 
low-impact sample as a control group for other state-level changes increases the precision of the 
estimates. Including demographic controls and state and year fixed effects (column 2), 18--23 
year olds in the high-impact sample are 0.7 of a percentage point more likely to be enrolled in 
college (on a base of 26 percent) and are 1.1 percentage points more likely to have ever enrolled 
in college (on a base of 41 percent). These effects are smaller than those found for the high-
impact sample only, indicating that either there are other changes in the states that implement 
EITCs that affect the education outcomes of all individuals in the state, or that some of the 
individuals in the low-impact sample may actually be receiving the EITC as well. If that is the 
case, these estimates can be thought of as a lower-bound, as some of the individuals in the low-
impact sample may also benefit from the increases in the EITC. Results from the triple-
difference analysis are also quite similar across the three samples. Effects are largest in the CPS 
sample (though not statistically significantly different from the SIPP), which may reflect sample 
selection due to the types of individuals likely to be living at home in the CPS. In the CPS, 18--
20 year olds are 1.8 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in college (on a base of 26 
percent), 1.5 percentage points more likely to have a high school degree (on a base of 58 
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 percent), and 2 percentage points more likely to have ever enrolled in college (on a base of 33 
percent). As estimates from equation (2) are more precisely estimated and reflect a lower-bound 
on the effects of the EITC on educational attainment, I will focus on the triple-difference 
specification for all following tables. 
Turning to estimates for degree completion, Table 6 shows results only for the 18--23 
year olds in the SIPP, since almost no one in the 18--20 year old sample has either an associate's 
degree or a bachelor's degree. While there is no effect of the EITC on the likelihood of 
completing an associate's degree there is a small, 0.3 of a percentage point increase in the 
likelihood of completing a bachelor's degree associated with a $1,000 increase in the EITC. 
While this effect is quite small, it represents a large change in percentage terms. Just 3 percent of 
the high-impact sample has a bachelor's degree prior to state EITC implementation, so this 
represents a 10 percent increase in the share of bachelor's degree holders. 
IV. A. Timing of income interventions 
To address the question of whether the EITC increases college enrollment by providing a 
conditional cash transfer to college-aged children or through increasing household income when 
children are young, I next examine how effects of the maximum EITC vary depending on how 
old the respondent was at the time of state EITC implementation.18 Because of the variation in 
timing of state EITC implementation, some individuals are exposed to the EITC for more years 
of their childhood. Depending on how old the individual was when the state implemented an 
EITC, some individuals may have benefited from many years of additional EITC income. Figure 
4 plots the effects of the maximum EITC by how old the 18--23 year olds in the SIPP were when 
the EITC was implemented in their state. If the EITC works through improving the schooling of 
children when young, we would expect to find larger effects for individuals who were younger 
18 Information about cross-state moves are rather limited in the SIPP, so I assume that the current state of 
residence was constant throughout an individual's life. Very few individuals move across states 
throughout the course of the SIPP panel. 
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 when the EITC was implemented in their state. If instead, the EITC helps alleviate short-term 
credit constraints in paying for college, we would expect to find little variation in the effects of 
the EITC by age. 
The coefficient plotted in Figure 4 is the triple interaction of the maximum EITC with an 
indicator for being in the high-impact sample for each age group illustrated. All individuals who 
were living in a state that implemented an EITC after they turned 23 were grouped together, and 
the reference category is individuals living in states that never implemented EITCs. There is a 
clear, negative association between age at time of implementation and educational attainment. 
The largest effects can be seen for individuals who were younger than 12 at the time of 
implementation, and no effects, or negative effects can be seen for individuals who were 23 or 
older. This implies that individuals who were exposed to a state EITC for more years of their 
childhood are more likely to have positive education outcomes, indicating that the EITC does 
work through improving the schooling of children when they are young. While many of the 
outcomes are still significant and positive for individuals who were 12--17 or 18--22 when their 
state implemented an EITC, these graphs suggest that effects are larger for the individuals 
exposed to the EITC for more years of their childhood.19  In contrast to the large effects found in 
Manoli and Turner (2014), this analysis provides no evidence that conditional cash transfers for 
18--23 year olds increase college enrollment among disadvantaged youth. My analysis exploits a 
different type of exogenous variation in household income, generated from state EITC 
expansions, while Manoli and Turner (2014) use a regression discontinuity approach among 
EITC recipients just above and below the first kink point in the EITC benefit structure. My 
estimation incorporates both the income effect generated by the increased generosity of state 
EITC benefits, as well as the substitution effect of increasing the incentive for 19--23 year olds 
19 Appendix Figure 2 shows the same exercise using the CPS sample of 18--20 year olds. Results using 
the CPS confirm the results from the SIPP and indicate a stronger, negative association between age at 
EITC implementation and education outcomes. 
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 to remain in school in order to remain dependents on their parents tax forms, both of which 
should increase college enrollment. Since all of the individuals in the Manoli and Turner (2014) 
sample receive the EITC, those estimates reflect only the income effect of increasing cash-on-
hand around the time of college enrollment decisions. 
IV. B. Effects by gender, race, household composition 
Table 7 presents differences in results by gender, family structure, and race. Results indicate that 
effects are larger and more significant among women, children living with a single parent, and 
non-Hispanic Blacks. While point estimates for men are somewhat similar to those for women, I 
only obtain significant results for women. Following an increase in the EITC by $1,000, women 
are 0.8 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in college and 1.5 percentage points more 
likely to have ever enrolled in college. Similarly, children living with only one parent are 1.6 
percentage points more likely to be enrolled in college and 2.5 percentage points more likely to 
have ever enrolled in college following an increase in the EITC by $1,000. Approximately 75 
percent of all EITC claims come from single-headed households, so even though children from 
single-parent households tend to be at a disadvantage economically, we would expect that 
changes in the EITC would primarily affect children from single-headed households. Finally, 
effects are also more significant for black youth. Following an increase in the EITC by $1,000, 
black individuals are 1.2 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in college and 2.2 
percentage points more likely to have ever enrolled in college. 20 
Lastly, if one of the mechanisms driving increases in educational attainment is the added 
EITC benefit a household would receive if their child remained in school past age 18, we would 
expect different responses to the EITC based on the number of children living in the household. 
20 Approximately half of the 18--23 year olds in my sample living with only one parent were eligible for 
the EITC in the first year of the SIPP compared to 20 percent of those living with both parents. Similarly 
for black families---approximately 45 percent of black children were eligible for the EITC in the first year 
of the SIPP sample, compared to 25 percent of children in non-black families. 
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 Prior to the 2009 tax year, households could only claim up to two children for the EITC---more 
than two children did not increase the benefit amount. After 2008, families could claim up to 
three children, so that having a third child both increased the replacement rate on earnings, and 
the maximum potential benefit. Beyond three children, there is no added EITC benefit for 
additional children. Therefore we would expect to find smaller or no responses in college 
enrollment among households with four or more children, since keeping a fourth child in college 
does not increase the value of the household EITC benefit. 
In Figure 5, I show how the likelihood of ever enrolling in college varies by the number 
of children under 24 (including the respondent) living in the household at the start of the SIPP 
survey. Here, regressions were estimated separately by gender for each household size. Results 
in Figure 5 show that effects of a $1,000 increase in the maximum EITC on ever enrolling in 
college are only significant for households with one or two children. There are relatively few 
households with four or more children, so the estimates are not precise enough to rule out larger 
effects for households with four or more children compared to one child, but the trend certainly 
appears to be a declining effect of the EITC on college enrollment for households with more 
children. This supports the hypothesis 
that effects should be concentrated among households with fewer children, since each additional 
child up to three children garners a higher household EITC benefit but households with more 
than three children do not receive a higher benefit than households with exactly three children.  
IV. C. Robustness Checks 
To test whether parental education serves as a good proxy for EITC eligibility, I replicate the 
analysis presented in the bottom panel of Table 5 using a number of alternative definitions for 
the high-impact sample. Results are presented in Appendix Table 3. Using actual eligibility for 
the EITC generates larger effects for years of schooling and high school graduation than using 
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 parents' education as the definition of eligibility. While the results in Table 5 showed no 
significant increase in high school graduation rates, using actual eligibility indicates that 
individuals are about 1 percentage point more likely to graduate from high school following an 
increase in the EITC by $1,000. Results for college enrollment are somewhat comparable to 
those found in Table 5: following a $1,000 increase in the EITC, individuals are about 1 
percentage point more likely to have ever enrolled in college.  
To address concerns that sample selection may account for the observed effects, I employ 
two final strategies: first, I include all of the individuals not living with a parent at the start of the 
survey in the high-impact sample to test whether results are driven by changes in who is 
observed in the sample as a function of EITC benefit changes. Finally, I also conduct an analysis 
restricting the sample of 18--23 year olds to those who were younger than 19 at the start of the 
survey, which represents approximately 88 percent of that sample. Including individuals not 
living with a parent as part of the high-impact sample produces somewhat larger results. These 
individuals tend to be older than those observed living with a parent, so it is possible that these 
individuals were also affected by EITC changes but moved out of their parents' houses before the 
start of the SIPP survey. Finally, the last column shows results restricting the sample to 18--23 
year olds who were younger than 19 at the start of the survey, which captures nearly 90 percent 
of individuals fitting the age criterion. These results are quite similar to the main results 
presented in Table 5, although the reduced sample size leads to less precisely-estimated effects. 
All of these robustness checks present similar results to those reported in Table 5, suggesting that 
results are not sensitive to the particular definitions of the high-impact sample or sample 
selection criteria. 
V. Conclusion  
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 This paper analyzes the effect of household income on the educational attainment of children 
from low-educated households. Using variation in both the timing of implementation and 
generosity of state-level EITC benefits, I have shown that increasing state EITC benefits 
significantly increases the educational attainment of children who grow up with low-educated 
parents. After an increase in EITC benefits by $1,000, 18--23 year olds gain about 0.11 years of 
schooling, are 2.3 percentage points more likely to have completed high school, and are 2.7 
percentage points more likely to have ever enrolled in college, compared to children who live in 
states that do not implement EITCs. Results are qualitatively quite similar among 18--20 year 
olds from the SIPP and CPS. Controlling for state-level trends in education outcomes using 
children from highly-educated backgrounds produces somewhat smaller, more precisely-
estimated positive effects. 18--23 year olds growing up in low-educated households are 0.7 
percentage points more likely to be enrolled in college and are 1.1 percentage points more likely 
to have ever enrolled in college compared to individuals from highly-educated households. 
While few individuals in this sample complete a bachelor's degree (3 percent of 18--23 year olds 
in states that implement EITCs), I find a 10 percent increase in the likelihood of completing a 
bachelor's degree associated with a $1,000 increase in the EITC. In analyzing differences by 
subgroups, I find that effects are larger and more significant for women, individuals who grow 
up in single-parent households, and black children. 
In assessing whether the EITC works to improve the education outcomes of children by 
providing short-run increases to household income during college-going years or through 
increases in household income when children are young, I find evidence that effects are largest 
for children who were exposed to a state EITC before age 12. This suggests that the EITC 
improves the educational attainment of children growing up in low-educated households by 
increasing household income throughout their lives. This supports previous research examining 
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 the test scores of children of EITC-recipients (Chetty et al. 2011, Dahl and Lochner 2012). 
Building on the results from Dahl and Lochner (2012), Chetty et al. (2011) examine the impact 
of an increase in child test scores (generated from changes in teacher quality) on college 
enrollment for a sample of children from a large, urban school district. The authors find that a 1 
standard deviation increase in a single year of test scores leads to a 5.5 percentage point increase 
in college enrollment rates. To put this finding in the context of Dahl and Lochner (2012), the 
authors calculate that a $1,000 increase in the EITC should lead to a 0.3 percentage point 
increase in college enrollment. The estimates in this analysis are slightly larger than the 0.3 
percentage point increase in college enrollment found by Chetty et al. (2011) but may reflect 
differences in identification strategy or different potential mechanisms through which the EITC 
affects college enrollment. Chetty et al. (2011) estimate the effects of the EITC on college 
enrollment solely through a one-year increase in test scores. My estimates suggest that the EITC 
may increase college enrollment through more channels than just test scores (e.g. through 
conditional cash transfers to college-aged children or the development of non-cognitive skills). 
This analysis has shown that, in addition to lifting millions of households out of poverty 
each year, the EITC also helps increase the educational attainment of children from 
economically-disadvantaged households. The EITC is a wide-reaching program that affects a 
large share of families in the United States. Recent estimates suggest that fully half of all 
households with children will claim the EITC at some point over an 18 year period (Horowitz 
and Dowd 2011). I find evidence that the EITC helps children enroll in college and complete 
more years of schooling, which supports previous research linking the EITC to higher test scores 
among low-income children (Dahl and Lochner 2012). This provides further evidence that the 
EITC not only works to lift families out of poverty for the current generation, but also provides 
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 hope of upward mobility for future generations of children from low socioeconomic 
backgrounds.  
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Table 1. States with Earned Income Tax Credits, year of implementation, benefit level at 
implementation, and in 2011 tax year (as a percent of federal EITC) 
  
Year of 
implementation 
Benefit level in year of 
implementation (as a 
percent of federal 
benefit) 
Benefit level as of 2011 
tax year (as a percent of 
federal benefit) 
Rhode Island 1986 22.2 25 
Vermont 1988 23 32 
Wisconsin1 1989 75 34 
Iowa 1990 5 7 
Minnesota2 1991 10 45 
New York 1994 7.5 30 
Massachusetts 1997 10 15 
Oregon 1997 5 6 
Kansas 1998 10 18 
Maryland 1998 10 25 
Colorado 1999 8.5 0 
DC 2000 10 40 
Illinois 2000 5 5 
Maine 2000 5 5 
New Jersey 2000 10 20 
Oklahoma 2002 5 5 
Indiana 2003 6 9 
Nebraska 2003 8 10 
Delaware 2006 20 20 
Virginia 2006 20 20 
New Mexico 2007 8 10 
North Carolina 2008 3.5 5 
Michigan 2008 10 20 
Louisiana 2008 3.5 3.5 
Connecticut 2011 30 30 
        
Source: Tax Policy Center http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=293 
1: Wisconsin has a system based on the number of children in the household. Rate shown here is for households with 
3 or more children. 
2: Minnesota has a system based on whether there are any children living in the household, and after 1997, household 
earnings. Rate shown here is for households with children and the maximum possible rate given income. 
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 Table 2. Descriptive statistics before and after state EITC implementation, relative to individuals who live in 
states that never implement EITCs, 18-23 year olds living with at least one parent at the beginning of the survey 
and neither parent has more than a high school degree 
  
Never-
implementing 
states 
Pre-state 
EITC 
Post-state 
EITC 
Change after 
implementation 
(std. err.) 
Currently enrolled in college 0.23 
 
0.26 
 
0.29 
 
0.047 
 
(.421) 
 
(.436) 
 
(.452) 
 
(.022) 
Years of schooling 11.85 
 
11.97 
 
12.08 
 
0.189 
 
(1.532) 
 
(1.605) 
 
(1.482) 
 
(.062) 
Has a high school degree 0.66 
 
0.70 
 
0.71 
 
0.041 
 
(.475) 
 
(.459) 
 
(.453) 
 
(.02) 
Ever enrolled in college 0.37 
 
0.41 
 
0.43 
 
0.050 
 
(.481) 
 
(.491) 
 
(.495) 
 
(.023) 
Has at least an associate's degree 0.04 
 
0.04 
 
0.07 
 
0.029 
 
(.203) 
 
(.2) 
 
(.258) 
 
(.009) 
Has at least a bachelor's degree 0.02 
 
0.03 
 
0.03 
 
0.013 
 
(.138) 
 
(.165) 
 
(.184) 
 
(.004) 
Black 0.19 
 
0.24 
 
0.15 
 
-0.053 
 
(.39) 
 
(.425) 
 
(.357) 
 
(.048) 
Hispanic 0.305 
 
0.122 
 
0.193 
 
-0.053 
 
(.46) 
 
(.327) 
 
(.394) 
 
(.084) 
Female 0.44 
 
0.43 
 
0.50 
 
0.063 
 
(.496) 
 
(.496) 
 
(.5) 
 
(.017) 
Age 20.11 
 
20.21 
 
20.16 
 
0.013 
 
(.95) 
 
(1.672) 
 
(1.663) 
 
(.046) 
Maximum federal and state EITC (in 
1,000s of 2011$ ) 3.995 
 
3.214 
 
5.793 
 
2.050 
 
(1.384) 
 
(1.362) 
 
(1.07) 
 
(.284) 
Number of male siblings in the household 0.716 
 
0.612 
 
0.639 
 
-0.043 
 
(.95) 
 
(.827) 
 
(.892) 
 
(.058) 
Number of female siblings in the 
household 0.629 
 
0.532 
 
0.608 
 
0.011 
 
(.881) 
 
(.813) 
 
(.868) 
 
(.053) 
Living with both parents 0.651 
 
0.647 
 
0.622 
 
-0.028 
 
(.477) 
 
(.478) 
 
(.485) 
 
(.029) 
        Number of observations     17,271        7,806         5,642      
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, 2008, 18-23 year olds 
living with at least one parent in the first month of the survey, neither parent has schooling beyond a high school degree. 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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 Table 3. Means of outcome variables of interest for individuals living with their parents at the 
beginning of the survey and neither parent has more than a high school degree, before and after 
state EITC implementation relative to states that never implement EITCs, by data source 
SIPP 18-20 year olds       
  
Never-
implementing 
states 
Pre-state 
EITC 
Post-state 
EITC 
Change after 
implementation 
(std. err.) 
        Currently enrolled in college 0.240 
 
0.281 
 
0.303 
 
0.051 
 
(.427) 
 
(.449) 
 
(.459) 
 
(.026) 
Years of schooling 11.61 
 
11.72 
 
11.77 
 
0.123 
 
(1.415) 
 
(1.418) 
 
(1.302) 
 
(.071) 
Has a high school degree 0.557 
 
0.592 
 
0.614 
 
0.046 
 
(.497) 
 
(.49) 
 
(.487) 
 
(.024) 
Ever enrolled in college 0.312 
 
0.364 
 
0.371 
 
0.043 
 
(.463) 
 
(.481) 
 
(.483) 
 
(.028) 
        Number of observations     10,908       4,628       3,489      
 CPS 18-20 year olds       
  
Never-
implementing 
states 
Pre-state 
EITC 
Post-state 
EITC 
Change after 
implementation 
(std. err.) 
        Currently enrolled in college 0.229 
 
0.258 
 
0.313 
 
0.076 
 
(.42) 
 
(.438) 
 
(.464) 
 
(.006) 
Years of schooling 11.53 
 
11.61 
 
11.73 
 
0.185 
 
(1.305) 
 
(1.34) 
 
(1.28) 
 
(.017) 
Has a high school degree 0.545 
 
0.580 
 
0.605 
 
0.051 
 
(.498) 
 
(.494) 
 
(.489) 
 
(.006) 
Ever enrolled in college 0.297 
 
0.328 
 
0.382 
 
0.077 
 
(.457) 
 
(.47) 
 
(.486) 
 
(.006) 
        Number of observations     19,884       6,860       8,628      
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, 2008, 
18-20 year olds living with at least one parent in the first month of the survey, neither parent has 
schooling beyond a high school degree.  Current Population Survey March Supplement 1992-2011, 
sample of 18-20 year olds living with at least one parent at interview, has schooling beyond a high school 
degree.  
Note: Individuals who live in states that never implement EITCs serve as the comparison group. Standard 
deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 4. Test for exogeneity of State EITC benefits 
  
 
States that ever implement 
EITCs 
 
All states 
Dependent Variable: 
Maximum federal and 
state EITC in year t (in 
thousands of 2011 
dollars)     
Maximum federal and 
state EITC in year t (in 
thousands of 2011 
dollars)   
Log state GDP per capita -0.650 
  
0.258 
 
 
(.759) 
  
(.436) 
 Unemployment rate (*100) -0.047 
  
-4.90E-04 
 
 
(.036) 
  
(.022) 
 Log real minimum wage -0.298 
  
-0.101 
 
 
(.174) 
  
(.079) 
 Per student spending on higher 
education (*1,000) -0.005 
  
-0.023 
 
 
(.046) 
  
(.023) 
 Maximum monthly welfare 
benefit for family of 3 (*100) 0.052 
  
0.027 
 
 
(.113) 
  
(.053) 
 State fixed effects Y 
  
Y 
 
      Year fixed effects Y 
  
Y 
 
      Number of observations 480     891   
Source: Statistics on state-level unemployment rates, state-level GDP, and state-level minimum wage from 1990-
2011. State-level spending on higher education from the State Higher Education Executive Officers. *** p<.01 ** 
p<.05 * p<.10 
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 Table 5. The effect of the maximum federal and state EITC benefit on educational outcomes of individuals living with at least one parent 
in the first month of the survey. By data source. 
             High-impact sample SIPP 18-23 year olds SIPP 18-20 year olds CPS 18-20 year olds 
  
No 
controls   W/controls   
No 
controls   W/controls   
No 
controls   W/controls   
Outcome variable 
            Currently enrolled in college 0.014   0.015   0.017   0.017   0.010   0.010   
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.016) 
 Years of Schooling 0.089   0.107 ** 0.013   0.021   0.045   0.040   
 
(0.075) 
 
(0.051) 
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.049) 
 
(0.052) 
 High school graduate 0.016   0.023 * 0.009   0.007   0.010   0.007   
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.016) 
 Ever enrolled in college 0.022   0.027 ** 0.027   0.027 * 0.024   0.023   
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.020) 
 
(0.019) 
 Demographic controls N 
 
Y 
 
N 
 
Y 
 
N 
 
Y 
 
             Year fixed effects Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
             State fixed effects Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
             
Number of observations 
   
31,130    
        
31,130    
   
19,285    
         
19,285    
   
36,063    
        
36,063    
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 Triple-difference SIPP 18-23 year olds SIPP 18-20 year olds CPS 18-20 year olds 
  
No 
controls   W/controls   
No 
controls   W/controls   
No 
controls   W/controls   
Outcome variable 
            Currently enrolled in college 0.006 * 0.007 ** 0.009 ** 0.010 *** 0.018 *** 0.018 *** 
 
(.003) 
 
(.003) 
 
(.003) 
 
(.003) 
 
(.003) 
 
(.003) 
 Years of Schooling 0.020   0.026 * 0.017   0.021 * 0.050 *** 0.049 *** 
 
(.015) 
 
(.014) 
 
(.012) 
 
(.011) 
 
(.011) 
 
(.01) 
 High school graduate 0.001   0.003   0.004   0.005 * 0.016 *** 0.015 *** 
 
(.004) 
 
(.003) 
 
(.003) 
 
(.003) 
 
(.005) 
 
(.004) 
 Ever enrolled in college 0.010 *** 0.011 *** 0.009 ** 0.010 *** 0.019 *** 0.019 *** 
 
(.003) 
 
(.003) 
 
(.003) 
 
(.003) 
 
(.003) 
 
(.002) 
 Demographic controls N 
 
Y 
 
N 
 
Y 
 
N 
 
Y 
 
             Year fixed effects Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
             State fixed effects Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
             
Number of observations 
   
81,724    
        
81,724    
   
51,374    
         
51,374    
   
97,123    
        
97,123    
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, 2008, 18-23 year olds living with at least one parent in the first 
month of the survey.  Current Population Survey March Supplement 1992-2011, sample of 18-20 year olds living with at least one parent at interview.  
 Note: OLS Models, clustered standard errors at state level presented in parentheses. Separate regressions for each cell. SIPP outcomes evaluated in each March of 
the survey. Coefficient in top panel is maximum federal and state EITC value in a given year (in thousands of dollars, 2011$), coefficient in bottom panel is 
maximum federal and state EITC value in a given year interacted with indicator for whether the individual lives in a household where neither parent has more than a 
high school degree. Demographic controls include gender, race, number of male and female siblings living in the household, whether both parents are present in the 
household, a control for number of times the respondent appears in the sample (up to 4 times, SIPP sample only), state-level unemployment rate, and minimum 
wage. *** indicates significance at p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 
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 Table 6. The effect of the maximum federal and state EITC benefit on 
degree attainment of 18-23 year olds living with their parents in the first 
month of the survey.  
Triple-difference SIPP 18-23 year olds 
  
No 
controls   Add controls   
Outcome variable 
    Has at least an associate's degree -0.002   -0.001   
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 Has at least a bachelor's degree 0.003 * 0.003 * 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.002) 
 Demographic controls N 
 
Y 
 
     Year fixed effects Y 
 
Y 
 
     State fixed effects Y 
 
Y 
 
     Number of observations    81,724            81,724    
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 
2001, 2004, 2008, 18-23 year old children living with at least one parent in the first 
month of the survey.  
 Note: OLS Models, clustered standard errors at state level presented in parentheses. 
Separate regressions for each cell.  SIPP outcomes evaluated in each March of the 
survey.Coefficient is maximum federal and state EITC value in a given year interacted 
with indicator for whether the individual lives in a household where neither parent has 
more than a high school degree. Demographic controls include gender, race, number of 
male and female siblings living in the household, whether both parents are present in 
the household, a control for number of times the respondent appears in the sample (up 
to 4 times), state-level unemployment rate, and minimum wage.  *** indicates 
significance at p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 
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 Table 7. The effect of the maximum federal and state EITC benefit on educational outcomes of 18-23 year olds living with 
at least one parent in the first month of the SIPP survey. Differences by gender, family structure, and race 
  
 
Differences by gender Differences by family structure Differences by race 
  Men Women Both parents Single parent White Black Hispanic 
Outcome variable 
              Currently enrolled in college 0.006   0.008 * 0.002   0.016 *** 0.004   0.012 * 0.005 
 
 
(.005) 
 
(.004) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.009) 
 Years of Schooling 0.028   0.023   0.014   0.046   0.016   0.029   0.037 
 
 
(.017) 
 
(.017) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.031) 
 High school graduate 0.004   0.001   0.002   0.006   0.001   0.001   0.003 
 
 
(.004) 
 
(.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 Ever enrolled in college 0.008   0.015 *** 0.006   0.024 *** 0.007 
 
0.022 ** -0.002 
 
 
(.005) 
 
(.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.009) 
 Demographic controls Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
               Year fixed effects Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
               State fixed effects Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
               
Number of observations    43,280    
 
38,444        58,740        22,984        53,395        10,612    
    
10,158    
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, 2008, 18-23 year olds living with at least one parent in the first month 
of the survey.  
 Note: OLS Models, clustered standard errors at state level presented in parentheses. Separate regressions for each cell. Outcomes from the SIPP evaluated in each 
March of the survey. Coefficient is maximum federal and state EITC value in a given year (in thousands of dollars, 2011$) interacted with indicator for living in a 
household where neither parent has schooling beyond a high school degree. Demographic controls include gender, race, number of male and female siblings living in 
the household, whether both parents are present in the household, a control for number of times the respondent appears in the sample (up to 4 times, SIPP only), state-
level unemployment rate, and minimum wage. *** indicates significance at p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10.  
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 Figure 1. Maximum federal and state EITC by time to state EITC implementation, in thousands of dollars (2011$) 
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Figure 2. EITC tax schedule for 2011, single-headed households by number of children and earnings 
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Figure 3. Effect of EITC on outcomes, by time since state EITC implementation; 10 years before and after implementation, relative to 
states that never implement; 18-23 year olds  
 
    
a) Likelihood of being enrolled as full-time college student               b)    Number of years of schooling 
     
c) Likelihood of having a high school degree     d)   Likelihood of ever enrolling in college 
 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008.  
 
Note: Graph of the effect of the maximum EITC interacted with an indicator for being in the high impact sample on the outcome indicated below each 
graph for individuals by years until (since) state EITC implementation, relative to states that never implement EITCs. Effects normalized to zero in the year 
before implementation. Graphs generated from linear regressions that include basic demographic characteristics: race, age, gender, number of siblings 
living in the household, an indicator for whether both parents live in the household, and number of times included in the sample. State unemployment rate 
and minimum wage also included. State and year fixed effects included in all models, standard errors clustered at the state level.  95% confidence intervals 
indicated with lighter grey lines.
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Figure 4. Effect of the EITC on outcomes of interest by age at state EITC implementation, reference: living in a state with no EITC  
   
a) Likelihood of being enrolled as full-time college student     b)   Number of years of schooling 
   
c)   Likelihood of having a high school degree     d)   Likelihood of ever enrolling in college 
 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008.  
Note: Graph of the effect of the maximum EITC interacted with an indicator for being in the high-impact sample on the outcome indicated below each 
graph for individuals at each age category.  Age categories represent how old the respondent was when the state implemented the EITC. Reference age 
group is individuals living in states that never implement EITCs.  
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 Figure 5. Effect of maximum EITC in a given state and year on likelihood of ever enrolling in college for high-impact sample relative 
to low-impact sample, by number of children under age 24 living in the household, 18-23 year olds in the SIPP 
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 Appendix Table 1. Descriptive statistics by whether the individuals resides with at least one parent at the time of interview, by data source 
 
SIPP 18-23 year olds SIPP 18-20 year olds CPS 18-20 year olds 
  
Living with 
at least one 
parent 
Not living 
with a parent 
Living with 
at least one 
parent 
Not living 
with a parent 
Living with at 
least one 
parent 
Not living 
with a parent 
Currently enrolled in college 40.5% 
 
18.3% 
 
42.3% 
 
21.9% 
 
40.7% 
 
23.9% 
 
 
(.491) 
 
(.386) 
 
(.002) 
 
(.414) 
 
(.002) 
 
(.002) 
 Years of Schooling 12.38 
 
12.20 
 
12.04 
 
11.64 
 
11.94 
 
11.64 
 
 
(1.512) 
 
(2.003) 
 
(.006) 
 
(1.735) 
 
(.004) 
 
(.008) 
 Has a high school degree 76.5% 
 
77.0% 
 
67.2% 
 
64.6% 
 
65.5% 
 
66.5% 
 
 
(.424) 
 
(.421) 
 
(.002) 
 
(.478) 
 
(.002) 
 
(.002) 
 Ever enrolled in college 57.3% 
 
45.7% 
 
50.8% 
 
35.2% 
 
49.0% 
 
35.5% 
 
 
(.495) 
 
(.498) 
 
(.002) 
 
(.478) 
 
(.002) 
 
(.002) 
 Has at least an Associate's degree 8.5% 
 
12.6% 
 
1.6% 
 
2.8% 
 
1.2% 
 
2.1% 
 
 
(.278) 
 
(.332) 
 
(.001) 
 
(.164) 
 
(.) 
 
(.001) 
 Has at least a Bachelor's degree 5.1% 
 
7.6% 
 
0.2% 
 
0.5% 
 
0.2% 
 
0.4% 
 
 
(.22) 
 
(.265) 
 
(.) 
 
(.067) 
 
(.) 
 
(.) 
 Black 14.5% 
 
13.6% 
 
14.4% 
 
16.6% 
 
13.9% 
 
18.6% 
 
 
(.352) 
 
(.343) 
 
(.002) 
 
(.372) 
 
(.001) 
 
(.002) 
 Other 6.0% 
 
5.4% 
 
6.2% 
 
5.9% 
 
6.1% 
 
7.0% 
 
 
(.238) 
 
(.226) 
 
(.001) 
 
(.235) 
 
(.001) 
 
(.001) 
 Female 45.9% 
 
58.7% 
 
47.3% 
 
59.4% 
 
45.7% 
 
57.9% 
 
 
(.498) 
 
(.492) 
 
(.002) 
 
(.491) 
 
(.002) 
 
(.002) 
 Age 20.09 
 
21.33 
 
18.94 
 
19.25 
 
18.88 
 
19.21 
 
 
(1.646) 
 
(1.546) 
 
(.004) 
 
(.795) 
 
(.003) 
 
(.004) 
 
Number of Observations 
   
81,724    
   
37,759    
   
51,374      11,951         97,123         42,260  
 Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, 2008, 18-23 year olds. Current Population Survey March 
Supplement 1992-2011, 18-20 year olds.  Current Population Survey March Supplement 1992-2011, sample of 18-20 year olds living with at least one 
parent at interview.  
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Appendix Table 2. Effect of the maximum federal and state EITC on demographic controls; individuals living with at least one parent at 
the beginning of the survey 
 
High-impact sample only Triple-difference 
  
18-23 year 
olds, SIPP 
18-20 year 
olds, SIPP 
18-20 year 
olds, CPS 
18-23 year olds, 
SIPP 
18-20 year olds, 
SIPP 
18-20 year olds, 
CPS 
Outcome variable 
            Black 0.016   0.011   0.006   -0.003   -0.004   0.003   
 
(.024) 
 
(.02) 
 
(.011) 
 
(.004) 
 
(.004) 
 
(.003) 
 Female 0.009   0.007   0.003   0.003   0.002   0.002   
 
(.015) 
 
(.019) 
 
(.014) 
 
(.003) 
 
(.005) 
 
(.004) 
 Age -0.037   0.032 * 0.017   -0.006   -0.001   0.005   
 
(.034) 
 
(.017) 
 
(.026) 
 
(.008) 
 
(.005) 
 
(.004) 
 Number of male siblings 0.083   0.106   -0.008   0.004   0.000   0.004   
 
(.065) 
 
(.079) 
 
(.032) 
 
(.011) 
 
(.012) 
 
(.008) 
 Number of female siblings 0.015   0.030   -0.008   0.012   0.016   -0.004   
 
(.041) 
 
(.042) 
 
(.036) 
 
(.011) 
 
(.012) 
 
(.011) 
 Living with both parents 0.015   0.005   -0.002   -0.014 *** -0.015 *** -0.009 *** 
 
(.018) 
 
(.018) 
 
(.018) 
 
(.004) 
 
(.004) 
 
(.003) 
 State fixed effects Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 Year fixed effects Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Number of Observations    31,130    
   
19,285    
   
36,063           81,724           51,374           97,123    
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, 2008, 18-23 year olds living with at least one parent in the first 
month of the survey.  Current Population Survey March Supplement 1992-2011, sample of 18-20 year olds living with at least one parent at interview.  
Note: OLS Models, clustered standard errors at state level presented in parentheses. Separate regressions for each cell.  SIPP outcomes evaluated in each March of 
the survey. Coefficient is maximum federal and state EITC value in a given year interacted with indicator for whether the individual lives in a household where 
neither parent has more than a high school degree. *** indicates significance at p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 
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 Appendix Table 3. The effect of the maximum federal and state EITC benefit on educational outcomes of 18-23 year olds, 
alternate specifications of sample 
  
Main results 
from table 5   
Actual 
eligibility in 
first year of 
survey   
Include individuals 
not living with a 
parent in treated 
sample   
Restrict to 
individuals under 
age 19 at start of 
survey 
Outcome variable 
          Currently enrolled in college 0.007 ** 0.004   
 
0.014 *** 
 
0.006   
 
(.003) 
 
(.003) 
  
(.002) 
  
(.004) 
 Years of Schooling 0.026 * 0.043 *** 
 
0.051 *** 
 
0.022   
 
(.014) 
 
(.011) 
  
(.014) 
  
(.013) 
 High school graduate 0.003   0.012 *** 
 
0.006 ** 
 
0.007 * 
 
(.003) 
 
(.003) 
  
(.002) 
  
(.004) 
 Ever enrolled in college 0.011 *** 0.013 *** 
 
0.023 *** 
 
0.007 ** 
 
(.003) 
 
(.005) 
  
(.002) 
  
(.004) 
 Demographic Controls Y 
 
Y 
  
Y 
  
Y 
 
           Year Fixed Effects Y 
 
Y 
  
Y 
  
Y 
 State Fixed Effects Y 
 
Y 
  
Y 
  
Y 
 Number of Observations        81,724       81,724           119,483             42,947    
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, 2008, 18-23 year old children living with at 
least one parent in the first month of the survey.  
 Note: OLS Models, clustered standard errors at state level presented in parentheses. Standard errors in parentheses. Separate regressions for 
each cell. SIPP outcomes evaluated in each March of the survey. Coefficient is maximum federal and state EITC value in a given year 
interacted with indicator for whether the household was eligible for the EITC in the first year of the survey. Demographic controls include 
gender, race, number of male and female siblings living in the household, whether both parents are present in the household, a control for 
number of times the respondent appears in the sample (up to 4 times), state-level unemployment rate and minimum wage. *** indicates 
significance at p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10.  
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 Appendix Figure 1. Effect of EITC on outcomes, by time since state EITC implementation; relative to states that never implement; 18-
20 year olds in the CPS (triple-difference) 
 
       
a) Likelihood of being enrolled as full-time college student   b)  Number of years of schooling 
      
c)  Likelihood of having a high school degree   d)  Likelihood of ever enrolling in college 
Appendix Figure 2. Effect of the EITC on outcomes of interest by age at state EITC implementation, grouped into five categories: less 
than 12 years old, 12-17 years old, 18-22 years old, 23 or older, or living in a state that never implements an EITC in the observation 
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 window. 18-20 year olds in the CPS, triple-difference sample 
 
      
a) Likelihood of being enrolled as full-time college student          b)  Number of years of schooling 
       
c)  Likelihood of having a high school degree    d)  Likelihood of ever enrolling in college 
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 CHAPTER TWO 
THE EITC AND FAMILY STRUCTURE: THE IMPACT OF EXPECTED SPOUSE 
EARNINGS 
 The earned income tax credit (EITC) has become the largest cash transfer program in the 
United States, distributing nearly $60 billion dollars in credits in 2010 (Tax Policy Center, 2013).  
The program has undergone several expansions and revisions since its inception in 1975, not 
only in absolute benefit level but also in the number of children included in the credit calculation 
and the income thresholds for married couples. In 2012, the maximum benefit for a household 
with three children was $5,891. Cohabitation rates have also increased sharply over the last 
couple of decades and have become less and less associated with marriage, particularly among 
the low-income population (Bumpass and Lu 2000; Kennedy and Bumpass 2011; Lichter, Qian, 
and Mellott 2006). The rise in cohabitation has also led to a larger share of births occurring 
outside of marriage (Martin et al 2011), raising much concern over the well being of children 
growing up in non-marital households (Brown 2004; Bumpass and Lu 2000; Fomby and Cherlin 
2007; Manning and Lichter 1996). The expansion of the EITC over time may have played a role 
in these trends. Since the EITC is based on family earnings, it may discourage marriage for many 
dual-earner households, while encouraging traditional, single-breadwinner families.21 In 
addition, the trapezoidal structure of the EITC benefit schedule may also create different 
incentives or disincentives to marry, depending on the level of household earnings. While efforts 
have been made in recent years to eliminate the marriage penalty from the EITC by increasing 
the earnings thresholds for married couples, the current policy retains elements that create 
distortive incentives for marriage. 
21 Recent studies have found that marginal tax rates for a second earner approach nearly 70 percent, once 
accounting for the phase out of the EITC and other means-tested programs such as food stamps (Kearney 
and Turner 2013). 
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 Much of the early research on the EITC focused on the labor supply effects (e.g. Eissa and 
Hoynes 2006, Ellwood 2000, Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001), generally finding a steep increase in 
the labor supply of single mothers due to the expansion of the EITC.  In more recent years, the 
literature has expanded to analyze the non-financial impacts of the EITC such as child well-being 
(Dahl and Lochner 2012), health insurance coverage (Baughman 2012), and consumption 
patterns (Smeeding, Ross-Phillips, and O’Connor 2002; Tach and Halpern-Meekin 2013). Others 
have studied the impact of the EITC on marriage and divorce (Dickert-Conlin and Houser 2002; 
Ellwood 2000; Herbst 2011), generally finding small or no effects. Aside from a small 
supplementary analysis on cohabiting couples and recently married couples in Ellwood (2000), 
none of the previous work accounts for spouse earnings and expected EITC changes upon 
marriage for those not already cohabiting or married.  Because of the benefit structure, the EITC 
may encourage marriage for some individuals, but discourage marriage for others; evaluating 
these different incentives is difficult without considering the impact of spouse earnings.  
There has been a considerable amount of work looking at how welfare benefits affect 
marriage decisions (see Moffitt 1998 for a review), and how the tax structure, more broadly, 
incentivizes or discourages marriage (e.g. Alm, Dickert-Conlin, and Whittington 1999; Alm and 
Whittington 2003).  Many of these papers find either no effect or only modest impacts of welfare 
benefits and tax penalties on marriage. Because the EITC provides much larger transfers than the 
welfare system, we might expect larger disincentives created by the EITC compared to those 
generated by welfare.  Further, unlike the traditional welfare program in the United States, 
Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF), the EITC does not impose lifetime limits to 
receiving benefits and may therefore have much larger financial consequences to marriage than 
TANF. The take-up rate for the EITC is also much higher than that of TANF—around 80% for 
those eligible in 2008, compared to around 40% for TANF (Tax Policy Center, 2011).  
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 In this analysis, I investigate how the EITC has impacted marriage and cohabitation patterns 
among low-income families, making the following contributions to the literature. First, this 
analysis adds to the literature on the impact of the EITC on family outcomes by quantifying the 
expected gains and losses in EITC benefits upon marriage. This paper is the first in the EITC 
literature to estimate a potential loss or gain in EITC benefits for individuals not currently 
cohabiting or married, providing the first descriptive picture of the distribution of expected gains 
or losses in EITC benefits associated with marriage. There are likely heterogeneous treatment 
effects of the EITC on marriage and cohabitation decisions depending on the expected change in 
EITC benefits upon marriage. Individuals who expect to gain benefits from the EITC through 
marriage should subsequently be more likely to marry, while individuals who expect to lose 
benefits upon marriage should be less likely to marry. Previous studies looking at the EITC and 
marriage have not considered the impact of spouse earnings when estimating the effect of the 
EITC on marriage, instead focusing only on the dollar value of the EITC. This analysis expands 
on prior work by simulating a marriage market to estimate potential gains or losses in EITC 
benefits associated with marriage for all single women. Finally, while there has been some 
research looking at the marriage disincentives associated with the EITC, this paper expands on 
that work to include an analysis of the impact of the EITC on cohabitation decisions. 
Cohabitation rates have increased sharply over the last few decades and are becoming an 
increasingly common family structure, particularly for low-income households (Kennedy and 
Bumpass 2011).  In this analysis, I simulate what marriage and cohabitation rates would have 
been had there been no marriage penalty associated with the EITC. 
To conduct this analysis, I first predict the earnings of potential spouses using data on single 
men from the 2001, 2004, and 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) in order 
to calculate an expected loss in EITC benefits upon marriage. Matching single men and women 
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 in the SIPP, I then use multinomial logistic regressions to analyze the effect of an expected loss 
or gain in EITC benefits upon marriage, on decisions for single women to cohabit or marry by 
the end of the SIPP survey period. Results from the simulated marriage market suggest that the 
average EITC-eligible woman can expect to lose approximately $1,000 in EITC benefits upon 
marriage, about 45% of her pre-marriage EITC benefits. From the multinomial logistic 
regression models, I find that every $1,000 in expected loss in EITC benefits is associated with a 
1.8 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of marrying and 1.1 percentage point increase in 
the probability of cohabiting by the end of the SIPP survey. These effects represent a 10-12% 
change in marriage and cohabitation rates for this sample of women in the SIPP.  
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, I discuss the details of the 
EITC; in Section 3 I review the current literature on the EITC and family structure. Section 4 
discusses the relevant data; Section 5 discusses the simulated marriage market and empirical 
strategy. Section 6 presents results; Section 7 concludes. 
II. Background on the EITC 
The EITC benefit structure is made up of three segments—a phase-in region, plateau, and 
phase-out region.  For a household with two children in the phase-in region, every dollar of 
earned income increases the EITC benefit by 40 cents. Once earnings reach a certain threshold, 
benefits remain constant until earned income reaches a second threshold, at which point benefits 
are taxed at a 20% phase-out rate. A similar pattern exists for households with one child or no 
children, but the phase-in and phase-out tax rates are lower. In addition, 24 states provide 
supplemental EITC benefits that are calculated based on the federal EITC. These state EITCs are 
generally calculated as a fixed percentage of the federal EITC, ranging from 3-45% of the federal 
EITC.  
Figure 1 illustrates the federal EITC benefit structure for the 2010 tax year. The solid 
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 lines indicate the benefit structure for a single tax payer, while the dotted lines illustrate the 
structure for a married couple. Beginning in 2002, the plateau region of the benefit structure was 
extended for married couples in an effort to reduce the marriage penalty associated with the 
EITC. In 2002, the plateau region was extended for an extra $1,000 for married couples and by 
2010, married couples could earn an extra $5,000 before the phase-out took effect. This change 
in the benefit structure for married couples provides some variation for this analysis since there 
was no marriage allowance for the first year of observation in the 2001 SIPP, a $1,000 allowance 
for the first year of the 2004 SIPP, and a $5,000 allowance for the first year of the 2008 SIPP. 
The trapezoidal structure of the EITC benefit schedule creates incentives for individuals 
on the phase-in portion of the schedule to increase their earnings because each dollar of earnings 
is associated with a larger EITC benefit, while those in the phase-out region may have incentives 
to reduce their earnings as each additional dollar of earnings is associated with a decline in EITC 
benefits. For individuals on the plateau, small changes in earnings will not affect EITC benefits.  
The methods for manipulating earnings may occur either through direct labor market behavior, 
such as increasing or reducing hours worked, or through marriage decisions.  
Working single mothers may have an incentive to remain single if their potential spouses’ 
earnings would reduce EITC benefits or render them ineligible entirely.  In contrast, non-
working single mothers may have increased incentives to marry working partners in order to 
receive benefits.  To illustrate, a single mother with two children earning $14,000 in 2010 is 
eligible for the maximum EITC benefit of $5,036.  A single, childless man earning $14,000 is 
not eligible for the EITC.  If she marries this single man, bringing their total family income to 
$28,000, their household benefit falls to $3,656—a loss of $1,379. Under this scenario, the 
couple might choose to remain unmarried in order to collect the higher benefit and still share 
income. It is worth noting here that this same hypothetical couple would be penalized to a much 
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 greater extent under the 2001 laws than the 2010 laws. In 2001, the benefit structure for a single 
head of household was the same for a married couple. This same single mother in 2001 would 
have earned an EITC of about $4,700 (2010$) if she remained single, but her EITC would fall to 
$1,060 were she to marry, a loss of approximately $3,600—nearly three times the loss she would 
experience under the 2010 laws.  
Not all couples would lose their EITC benefits were they to marry—many could actually 
earn a larger EITC within marriage than if they were to remain unmarried. For example, a non-
working single mother with two children would receive a $5,036 EITC by marrying a single man 
earning $14,000. In fact, many women located on the phase-in portion of the benefit structure 
could receive higher EITC benefits were they to marry their partners than if they remained 
unmarried. In this way, the EITC creates different incentives for individuals to marry or remain 
unmarried depending on where they lie on the benefit structure and what their potential spouses 
earn. Because of this, women of similar earnings levels may be eligible for very different EITC 
benefits under marriage based on the earnings of their potential spouses.  
III. Previous Literature  
The traditional economic framework for analyzing marriage behavior began in the 1970s, 
from work done by Gary Becker. Under the Becker (1974) model, individuals choose to marry if 
their utility within marriage exceeds their utility outside of marriage.  If two individuals are able 
to combine their resources and improve the total wellbeing of the household, then these two 
individuals marry. Becker (1981) also suggests that couples who specialize in different 
markets—one spouse working in the labor market and one specializing in home production—are 
likely to be better matches. More recent evidence refutes this theory, showing that highly-
educated women are more likely to marry (Oppenheimer 1997) and women are increasingly 
likely to marry partners with similar levels of educational attainment as themselves (Schwartz 
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 and Mare 2005). Coinciding with the increase in assortative mating among college-educated 
individuals in particular is a rise in the prevalence of cohabitation over the last couple of 
decades, particularly among the less-educated population (Bumpass and Lu 2000; Kennedy and 
Bumpass 2011; Lichter, Qian, and Mellott 2006; Lundberg and Pollak 2013).  
The EITC may have played a role in these trends, particularly among low-income 
individuals.  With the implementation and expansion of the EITC throughout the 1990s and early 
2000s, some individuals may gain a large tax credit from marriage, while others are penalized 
through the same system. If two working individuals can enjoy the same benefits within 
cohabitation as in marriage, they may choose not to marry if marrying reduces their EITC 
benefits. This assumes that cohabitation can be viewed as a substitute for marriage—that 
individuals can enjoy similar benefits within cohabitation as in marriage. This may be true for 
couples that risk losing social benefits, such as the EITC, if they were to marry, but also depends 
on differences in how finances are shared within marriage versus cohabitation. The literature on 
this topic is somewhat mixed, but most studies find some degree of income or expense pooling 
within cohabiting couples, although generally lower levels of resource pooling than for married 
couples (DeLeire and Kalil 2005; Kenney 2004; Oropesa, Landale, and Kenkre 2003).22 While 
cohabitation has become commonplace in recent years, the vast majority of individuals do wish 
to marry at some point in the future, when the necessary financial prerequisites have been met 
(Edin and Kefalas 2005; Smock, Manning, and Porter 2005; Gibson-Davis 2009), suggesting that 
marriage does serve a different purpose than cohabitation. Still, if couples are able to enjoy 
similar benefits within cohabitation as in marriage, particularly if they are able to maintain their 
welfare or EITC benefits, then the costs of losing those benefits may indeed influence whether or 
22 Many of these studies focus on cohabiting couples where both individuals are the biological parents of 
the children in the household. Due to data limitations, I am unable to distinguish between women 
cohabiting with the biological father of their children or an unrelated man. 
 60 
                                                 
 not couples choose to marry. 
 
III.B. EITC and Marriage 
 Much of the early research on the EITC focused on its impact on labor supply (for a 
review, see Hotz and Scholz (2003) or Meyer (2010)), with less focus on how the expansion of 
the EITC has altered union formation decisions. Ellwood (2000) analyzes the effect of the 
expansion of the EITC and the welfare system on the labor supply of single mothers as well as 
the impacts on marriage and cohabitation.  Using data from the Current Population Survey 
(CPS), he calculated the potential gain or loss in EITC benefits associated with marriage using a 
sample of cohabiting couples. He then analyzed the marriage and divorce rates among people 
who gain, lose, or experience no change in their EITC benefits upon marriage. His findings 
suggest little evidence of a response in marriage rates to the expansion of the EITC throughout 
the 1990s, but there is some evidence of an increase in marriage in the late 1990s among 
individuals who expect to gain EITC benefits from marriage. Ellwood suggested that this might 
be evidence for future behavioral responses. The EITC is distributed annually through the tax 
code, and may take multiple years to fully understand by the taxpayer.  As taxpayers gain 
information over time, we might expect behavioral responses to occur several years after a 
reform has taken place.  Now, as 24 states have their own EITCs in addition to a federal EITC 
reaching over $5,000 in 2012, individuals may have much more to lose (or gain) from marriage, 
depending on their household income.  Further, Ellwood’s analysis focused only on cohabiting 
couples, when potential spouse earnings are known. While the paper does a separate analysis for 
all single mothers, there is no calculation of potential spouse earnings and expected EITC losses 
or gains for single mothers who did not cohabit, the vast majority of the sample.  
Other recent work has also explored the connection between EITC benefits and family 
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 structure (Dickert-Conlin and Houser 2002, Herbst 2011).  Herbst (2011) used vital statistics 
data to analyze how the expansion of the EITC impacted marriage and divorce rates in states 
with more generous state EITCs over time.  He found that increases in the EITC were associated 
with significant declines in new marriage rates and had virtually no impact on divorce rates. 
Herbst found that a $1,000 increase in the EITC led to a 4.9% decrease in the new marriage rate 
in a given state (Herbst, 2011).  Despite having detailed information on marriage and divorce 
rates for all states from 1977-2004, the vital statistics data lack information about personal 
characteristics such as race, education, and income.  Further, Herbst (2011) cannot distinguish 
between cohabiting couples and individuals not living with partners, which might be an 
important distinction in determining who is likely to respond to the incentives tied to the credit.   
Dickert-Conlin and Houser (2002) used survey data to analyze the impact of the EITC on 
marriage and divorce rates in the early 1990s using the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP).  While these data capture more personal characteristics, many of the 
reforms made to the EITC have occurred throughout the 1990s and 2000s—increasing the 
overall value of the benefit, increasing the number of children eligible in calculating the EITC, 
and increasing the income threshold for married couples. In 2009, the EITC provided additional 
benefits for up to 3 children and was worth up to $5,666: a -45% tax rate on earnings up to 
$12,570.  In 1993, the last year of the Dickert-Conlin and Houser data, the maximum benefit for 
two children was $1,511: a -19.5% tax rate on earnings up to $7,750 (Tax Policy Center, 2011). 
Further, Dickert-Conlin and Houser (2002) did not calculate a potential loss or gain in the EITC 
upon marriage. Individuals with equal EITC benefits outside of marriage may have vastly 
different EITC benefits within marriage; level differences in the EITC are not enough to assess 
the potential costs and benefits associated with marriage.  
 The studies mentioned thus far have all found minor effects of the EITC on marriage 
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 decisions.  Many of them were based on somewhat older data, which often do not contain 
information on cohabiting partners. As the credit has become more generous over time, expected 
changes in EITC benefits associated with marriage may play an increasingly important role in 
cohabitation and marriage decisions.  Finally, none of the studies mentioned thus far have 
attempted to account for the types of spouses these individuals marry and the potential losses or 
gains in EITC benefits upon marriage.  
IV. Data  
Survey of Income and Program Participation 
Data come from a sample of single women between the ages of 18 and 50 from the 2001, 2004, 
and 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation, a nationally representative survey of 
36,700 households in 2001, 46,500 households in 2004, and 52,000 households in 2008. The data 
contain detailed information regarding income from various sources for each individual residing 
in the household. The data are also longitudinal, following individuals for 36 months in 2001, 48 
months in 2004, and 60 months in 2008. Its large sample size, coupled with detailed information 
on earnings and household structure make the SIPP an ideal data source for analyzing marriage 
and cohabitation behavior in the context of the EITC.   
I focused on the sample of unmarried individuals at the beginning of the survey who were 
eligible for the EITC during the first year of the SIPP survey and identified as the main 
respondent in the household. I then observed whether these individuals cohabit or marry by the 
end of the survey window.  I restricted the sample to female respondents between 18 and 50 to 
capture the sample most likely to experience a marriage or cohabitation transition. This yielded a 
sample of 6,745 individuals. I further restricted the analysis to individuals with a high school 
degree or less to best approximate the population of EITC recipients, 3,058 individuals. While 
eliminating individuals with at least some college experience reduced the sample by more than 
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 half, EITC recipients with college experience are likely to be more transient in their 
participation, as they typically have earnings well above the eligibility threshold for the EITC. 23 
Using information about family earnings in the first calendar year of the SIPP survey, I 
calculated the federal and state EITC the respondent expected to receive given the number of 
qualifying children residing in the household in the first month of the survey. A qualifying child 
is a biological child, adopted child, sibling, or descendent of any of these (such as grandchild or 
niece/nephew) who resides in the home for at least 6 months, or a foster child who lives in the 
house for the entire year.  Further, all qualifying children must be under 19 years old, 24 years 
old and a full-time student, or any age and permanently disabled (Internal Revenue Service 
2013).  
The SIPP provides limited information on demographic characteristics; I control for age, 
race, number of children living in the household, whether the individual was previously married, 
whether the individual had any private health insurance during the first year of the SIPP survey, 
and whether their potential spouse had volatile income. Number of children living in the 
household, marriage histories, health insurance status, and spouse income volatility are all 
included as potential indicators of marriage desirability. Women with children living in the 
household may be less desirable marriage partners because they come with extra responsibility 
and potential complications with previous partners. Women who have never been married before 
may have unobservable characteristics that make them less likely to marry at all. Women who 
lack private health insurance may be more likely to marry in order to gain health insurance 
coverage from a spouse. Finally, there has been increasing evidence that women look for 
financially-stable men when making marriage decisions (Edin and Kefalas 2005; Gibson-Davis 
23 As a falsification check, I also ran the analyses on individuals with some college or more to illustrate 
how higher-educated women are not likely to make marital or cohabitation decisions based on the EITC 
due to their transient eligibility. 
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 2005), so I control for whether the predicted spouse had ‘volatile’ income, as defined by a 
decline in income by more than 50% from year 1 to year 2 of the SIPP survey. 
V. Empirical Strategy 
V.A. Predicting Potential Spouse Income 
Estimating the potential losses or gains in EITC benefits associated with marriage requires 
first estimating the earnings of the potential spouse. For the majority of the sample, spouse 
earnings are unobservable because individuals do not cohabit or marry during the survey 
window. For individuals who do cohabit or marry, there may be concern that couples adjust their 
labor force participation in response to the union formation, and thus any calculation of a loss or 
gain in EITC benefits will reflect these post-union formation labor force responses. To address 
both of these issues, I simulate a marriage market for all individuals in the sample, regardless of 
whether a partner is observed at any point in the survey. This reduces concerns of measuring 
spouse earnings after the marriage or cohabitation decision, and also allows for calculation of the 
loss or gain in EITC benefits upon marriage for individuals who are never observed living with a 
partner during the survey window.  
I employ a strategy similar to that of Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan (2013), where separate 
marriage markets are constructed based on the race, age and education of the individuals in the 
sample and couples are randomly matched based on these demographic characteristics. Rather 
than placing individuals in a specific marriage market based on these characteristics, I first 
observe the characteristics of couples that are already married in the CPS March Supplement and 
use these matches to construct probabilities that specific matches will occur among single 
individuals. Pooling data from the 2002-2011 CPS March supplements, there are 90,900 married 
women. I divided these women into four race categories—white, black, Hispanic, and Asian/all 
others; four education categories—less than high school degree, high school degree, some 
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 college, and college degree or more; and six age categories—19–24, 25–29, 30–34, 35–39, 40–
49, and 50+.  I then divided their spouses into the same categories and created a 96x96 matrix, 
resulting in 9,216 different age-race-education spouse match possibilities. I then calculated the 
percent of married women in each age-race-education cell married to a man in each age-race-
education cell.  A table summarizing these findings can be found in Appendix Table 1. As one 
might expect, there is considerable educational and racial homogamy—for example, roughly 
90% of women are married to men of the same race. Similarly, women with less than a high 
school degree are more likely to marry men with less than a high school degree than men with a 
college degree.  Finally, women in each age cell are much more likely to marry men of their age, 
or one age category older. 
After calculating the probabilities of a woman of each type marrying each potential partner 
type, I then simulate a marriage market with the sample of women from the SIPP and a sample 
of single men aged 18-62 in the 2001, 2004, and 2008 SIPP panels, a sample of 30,718 men. For 
each single woman in the SIPP, I randomly drew 30,718 potential spouses with replacement 
from the SIPP and created a ‘successful’ match once finding the first man with the highest 
probability of matching, according to the probabilities generated from the sample of marriages in 
the CPS. I then calculated a potential EITC benefit under marriage for each match and quantified 
the expected loss or gain in EITC benefits upon marriage.  
A distribution of the expected change in EITC benefits upon marriage is shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 shows the difference between the household EITC benefit if the women remained single 
and the household EITC benefit if the women married their potential spouses. Positive numbers 
indicate that the EITC benefit remaining single is higher than the benefit under marriage. The 
average change in EITC benefits upon marriage is a $1,000 (2011$) loss in benefits, with some 
individuals in the sample losing over $6,000 in EITC benefits upon marriage. On the other hand, 
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 a few individuals in the sample actually gain $6,000 in EITC benefits upon marriage. It is clear 
from this figure though, that the majority of women would receive a lower EITC benefit upon 
marriage. In fact, approximately 65 percent of the sample would lose some of their EITC 
benefits upon marriage.  
 
V.B. Validation of Spouse Match 
Identifying whether individuals can expect to gain or lose EITC benefits upon marriage relies 
heavily on the quality of the spouse match. The average woman in the sample is matched to a 
potential spouse that earns approximately $24,000—$6,000 higher than the $18,000 observed for 
women who either cohabit or marry by the end of the SIPP survey. To check the quality of the 
matches made in the simulated marriage market, I compare the earnings distributions of the 
predicted spouses to the actual spouses or partners for the women in the sample who actually 
cohabit or marry. Appendix Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of predicted and observed spouse 
earnings for individuals who either cohabit or marry by the end of the SIPP survey. 95% 
confidence intervals are illustrated with black bars.  
Appendix figure 1 illustrates that the predicted spouse earnings are no different from the 
observed spouse earnings for the lower half of the distribution of spouse earnings. For 
individuals in the 60th percentile or higher, the predicted partner earnings are significantly higher 
than the actual spouse or partner earnings observed. This pattern is not entirely unexpected. The 
simulated marriage market only uses age, race, and education to evaluate the quality of matches 
and cannot take into account other characteristics of the individuals such as prior childbearing 
history or unobserved characteristics that might make individuals more or less desirable as 
marriage partners. As the sample of EITC-eligible women is predominantly low-income single 
mothers, there are likely unobserved characteristics that prevent them from marrying higher-
 67 
 earning spouses, but I am unable to observe these characteristics when matching them to 
potential spouses. Thus the simulated marriage market is likely to overestimate the quality of 
men that these single women marry. 
Since the differences in the earnings distributions are evident only in the top half of the 
earnings distribution, this is unlikely to substantially affect the calculation of the expected loss in 
EITC benefits upon marriage. The earnings of men in the top half of the earnings distribution are 
likely to render all of these women ineligible for the EITC. Despite this, I take a number of steps 
to attempt to account for these differences in the earnings distribution of potential spouses 
compared to the observed spouses. I first top-code the earnings of single men in the marriage 
market to $75,000, since none of the women in this sample go on to marry men who earn more 
than $75,000. This reduces the difference in the earnings between the predicted and observed 
spouses for individuals at the very top of the earnings distribution. Second, as a robustness 
check, I conduct separate analyses on the sub-group of women who are matched to men in the 
bottom half of the earnings distribution, since there are no significant differences between the 
predicted and observed earnings of spouses for this group. It is likely that the women marrying 
men in the bottom half of the earnings distribution are the ones most likely to alter their marriage 
or cohabitation behavior based on the value of their EITCs.  
 
V.C. Multinomial Logistic Regression 
 After assessing the change in EITC benefits upon marriage, I next run a multinomial 
logistic regression to estimate the likelihood of transitioning from single to cohabitation or 
marriage by the end of the SIPP survey.24  The conditional probability of marrying or cohabiting 
is modeled as: 
24 A few individuals experience a transition to both cohabitation and marriage over the time period, so I 
code these individuals as married by the end of the survey. Approximately 4% of the sample experiences 
both a cohabitation and a marriage within the 36-48 month surveys. 
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Where k represents the outcomes of interest, cohabiting or married,  are the outcome-specific 
coefficients on the EITC variables of interest—the dollar value of the EITC before marriage, the 
amount of expected change in EITC benefits, and a quadratic form of predicted spouse earnings.  
X is a vector of personal characteristics including education, race, age, and number of children. 
 is a set of year-specific controls, which allows differences across SIPP surveys,   is an 
individual error term. I assume there are j states over which the individual can choose—single, 
cohabiting, or married.   
As there are now 24 states that supplement the federal EITC, I also control for differences 
across states with their own EITCs in two different ways. In one model, I include an indicator for 
whether the state of residence has its own EITC, and in another, I include state fixed effects. 
State EITC benefits are also included in the calculation of the total benefit amount and the 
expected change in benefits upon marriage. 
 Variation in the value of the expected loss in EITC benefits come from two primary 
sources. The first is through the spouse match, where respondents are randomly matched to 
single men based on the race, age, and education of both the respondent and the spouse. Because 
I also control for demographic characteristics in the analyses, the effect of the expected loss in 
EITC benefits is not due to differences in marriage or cohabitation patterns by race or education, 
but due to the random variation in earnings generated by the spouse match.  
Second, as mentioned in the background section, there have been federal and state policy 
changes to the EITC benefit structure over the observed time period. Starting in 2002, the EITC 
benefit structure was expanded to allow married couples to earn more than single individuals and 
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 maintain the same EITC benefit. Because I calculate the expected EITC loss based on the first 
year of earnings observed in each of the three SIPP panels, some of the variation in these losses 
will be generated from the different policies. In 2001, there was no extra allowance for married 
couples, in 2004 there was a $1,000 allowance for married couples before benefits were phased 
out, and in 2009 married couples could earn $5,000 more than single filers before their benefits 
were phased out. Because these changes were implemented at the federal level, it is difficult to 
distinguish any effect of these policy changes from other general time trends that may have 
occurred between 2001 and 2009. In general, marriage rates have declined in recent years, which 
would counteract any positive effect of these policy changes on marriage rates, but individuals 
were also followed for a longer duration in the 2008 SIPP than the 2001 SIPP, providing a longer 
window of opportunity for a marriage to occur.25 In addition to the federal policy changes, 
several states have implemented their own supplemental EITCs over this time period, providing 
an additional source of variation in expected EITC losses. Because state EITCs are based on the 
federal EITC, if individuals expect to experience a reduction in their federal EITC upon 
marriage, they will also experience a reduction in their state EITC benefit.  
 
V.D. Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics are shown in Table 1, illustrating differences in characteristics between 
those who expect to lose benefits, gain benefits, or experience no change in benefits upon 
marriage. Among those who would lose EITC benefits upon marriage, the average loss in 
benefits was $2,130, or about 80% of the EITC benefits they would receive if they remained 
single. Those who would gain EITC benefits upon marriage tended to have lower earnings than 
25 Individuals were followed for 36 months for the 2001 SIPP, 48 months for the 2004 SIPP, and 60 
months for the 2008 SIPP. Nearly 80% of all marriages observed in this sample from the 2004 and 2008 
SIPP occurred within 36 months of the start of the panel. 
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 those who would lose benefits ($3,500 in earnings compared to $14,000), which would likely 
place them on the phase-in portion of the EITC benefit schedule. These women would 
experience an approximate 70% increase in their EITC benefits were they to marry, increasing 
their EITC benefits from $1,903 to $3,309. Consistent with predictions that losses in EITC 
benefits upon marriage should deter marriage, marriage rates are lower among those who expect 
to lose EITC benefits upon marriage compared to those who would gain benefits (12% compared 
to 17%), and cohabitation rates are approximately equal across groups (11% of the sample).  
Demographic differences are also apparent between individuals expecting to lose benefits 
and those expecting to gain benefits upon marriage. In general, these differences would predict 
higher marriage rates among individuals who expect to lose EITC benefits as these individuals 
are more likely to be white, have a high school diploma, and have slightly fewer children—all 
characteristics that have been shown to be positively associated with marriage. 
Table 2 shows patterns of EITC eligibility across the three SIPP panels used in this analysis. 
Policy changes to reduce the marriage penalty in the EITC between 2001 and 2008 were 
associated with a reduction in the likelihood that a single woman would experience a loss in 
EITC benefits upon marriage (71% in the 2001 SIPP compared to 53% in the 2008 SIPP), and a 
smaller loss for individuals who did experience a reduction in benefits ($1,800 in 2001 compared 
to $1,200 in 2008 SIPP (2011$)), despite similar levels of pre-marriage EITC benefits ($2,500 in 
both surveys (2011$)). Coinciding with this reduction in the marriage penalty associated with the 
EITC, marriage rates were also higher in the 2008 SIPP than in the 2001 SIPP, with 17% of the 
sample marrying in 2008 compared to 12% marrying in 2001. 
 
VI. Results 
Table 3 presents results from the multinomial logistic regressions predicting decisions to remain 
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 single, cohabit, or marry as a function of EITC benefits. The multinomial logistic regression 
jointly models the probability of cohabiting and marrying, in comparison to remaining single 
throughout the survey. All models use the sample of women who remain single throughout the 
survey as the reference group; standard errors are clustered at the state level. All values reported 
are average marginal effects. For indicator variables, the coefficient represents the discrete 
change in the outcome when the indicator variable increases from 0 to 1. The first model uses 
only a linear form of the expected change in EITC benefits upon marriage (measured in 
thousands of dollars), based on the predicted spouse’s earnings.  With no other controls, a $1,000 
increase in expected EITC loss is associated with virtually no change in the likelihood of 
cohabiting, and a 0.7 of a percentage point decline in the likelihood of marrying over the course 
of the SIPP survey. 
 Model 2 includes controls for demographic characteristics and whether the individual 
lives in a state with its own EITC. Once adding these controls, the effect of a $1,000 increase in 
EITC losses is associated with a slight, 0.3 of a percentage point increase in the likelihood of 
cohabiting, and a 0.9 of a percentage point decline in the likelihood of marrying. Controlling 
only for the change in EITC benefits upon marriage masks the large increase in household 
earnings associated with the expected loss in EITC benefits. In Model 3, I add a quadratic control 
for expected spouse earnings and an indicator for whether the spouse has volatile income—
defined as a drop in income by more than 50% over two years. After controlling for spouse 
earnings and the total amount of EITC benefits received while single, a $1,000 loss in EITC 
benefits is associated with a 0.9 of a percentage point increase in the probability of cohabiting, 
and a 1.6 percentage point decline in the probability of marrying. Since about 11% of the sample 
experiences a cohabitation and 13% experience a marriage over the course of the survey, these 
results represent a 8-12% change in marriage and cohabitation rates associated with a $1,000 loss 
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 in EITC benefits.  
Spouse earnings have a slight positive association with marriage—a $1,000 increase in 
spouse earnings increases one’s likelihood of marrying by 0.1 of a percentage point. Not 
surprisingly, this suggests that women not only respond to expected changes in their EITC 
benefits upon marriage, but also to the overall increase in household income. Women seem to 
have different criteria about the men they choose to cohabit with than the men they choose to 
marry: spouse earnings significantly increase the likelihood that a woman marries, but decrease 
the likelihood that she cohabits. This supports findings in the qualitative literature that low-
income women look for men with stable jobs and financial stability when choosing marriage 
partners (Edin and Kefalas 2005) and that high earnings are not a necessary condition to cohabit 
with a partner (Edin 2000; Smock, Manning, and Porter 2005). In order to preserve traditional 
gender identities, men and women may also be more reluctant to marry in situations where the 
woman out-earns her husband (Bertrand et al. 2013).26  I find no effect of volatile income on the 
likelihood of cohabiting or marrying, although the coefficients point in the expected direction—
individuals matched to spouses with volatile income are slightly less likely to marry than those 
matched to spouses with more stable income. Finally, in Model 4, rather than including an 
indicator variable for whether the individual lives in a state with an EITC, I include a set of state 
fixed effects. The results are qualitatively very similar, with expected changes in EITC benefits 
yielding a 1.1 percentage point increase in the likelihood of cohabiting, and a 1.8 percentage 
point decline in the likelihood of marrying by the end of the SIPP survey. 
Demographic controls perform as expected—black women are significantly less likely to 
marry and cohabit than white women, and Hispanic women are more likely to marry and less 
likely to cohabit than white women. Women without a high school degree are significantly more 
26 In results not shown, I also found that modeling spouse earnings using an indicator for whether the 
respondent out-earned her potential spouse had a negative association with the likelihood of marrying. 
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 likely to cohabit and significantly less likely to marry compared to women with a high school 
degree.  Surprisingly, the number of children in the household does not seem to have an effect on 
either cohabitation or marriage. I expected that children might deter women from marrying, or 
make them less attractive marriage partners than childless women. However, as most EITC-
recipients have children (85%), perhaps the actual number of children living in the household 
does not significantly alter one’s likelihood of marrying or cohabiting.27 As expected, women 
who have never been married before are 5 percentage points less likely to marry and 6 
percentage points more likely to cohabit, compared to women who have been married before. 
Finally, I find evidence consistent with Herbst (2011) that states with EITCs have lower 
marriage rates. Women living in states with their own EITCs are 4 percentage points less likely 
to marry and 2 percentage points more likely to cohabit. Finally, individuals are more likely to 
marry in the 2008 SIPP panel than in the 2001 SIPP, which may either reflect the decline in the 
marriage penalty associated with the EITC, or the longer duration over which individuals are 
observed in the 2008 SIPP compared to the 2001 SIPP.  
To put these result in the context of marriage and cohabitation rates, I next turn to a 
simulation exercise using results generated from Model 4 of the multinomial logistic regression 
in Table 3. Under the baseline model (expected EITC loss is about $1,060), about 11% of the 
sample cohabits during the survey, and about 14% marry.  If no one experienced a loss in EITC 
benefits upon marriage, results from the multinomial logistic regression predict that the 
cohabitation rate would drop to 10% and the marriage rate would increase to 16%. This exercise 
suggests that the introduction of the marriage penalty in the EITC increased the cohabitation rate 
by about 1 percentage point on a base of 11 percent (a 9% increase), and decreased the marriage 
rate by 2 percentage points on a base of 14 percent (a 14% decrease).  
27 Alternate measures of children in the household were also not significant such as whether the 
respondent had any children at all, or whether the respondent had two or more children. 
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VI.B. Falsification and Robustness Checks 
I next conduct an analogous analysis for women with some college experience or a 
college degree. Table 4 shows these results. The first two columns of Table 4 replicate the results 
from Model 3 in Table 3 for women with a high school degree or less who are eligible for the 
EITC. The next two columns show the same model for a sample of women with at least some 
college experience. All of these women were eligible for the EITC at the beginning of the SIPP 
survey, but the higher educated women are likely to have higher earnings in subsequent years. 
Indeed, I find virtually no effect of the EITC and income on marriage and cohabitation decisions 
for women who have at least some college experience. Interestingly enough, while the earnings 
of potential spouses is positively associated with marriage for the low-educated sample, I find no 
statistically significant relationship between spouses’ earnings and the likelihood of marriage for 
the highly-educated sample. This is consistent with some work suggesting that low-educated 
couples may be particularly averse to situations where the wife out-earns her husband (Bertrand 
et al. 2013). Further, the highly-educated sample is also less affected by whether the state has an 
EITC benefit of its own. While states with EITC benefits experienced a 4 percentage point 
decline in the marriage rate among women with a high school degree or less, there is no clear 
association between state EITCs and marriage and cohabitation patterns among the highly-
educated sample. 
As discussed throughout, the results of these analyses rely heavily on the assumptions 
made regarding potential spouse matches. Appendix figure 1 illustrated that the predicted 
earnings of spouses generated by the marriage market were generally higher than the actual 
earnings of spouses or partners observed by the sub-sample of women who marry or cohabit 
within the SIPP panel. This pattern is more pronounced among the top half of the spouse 
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 earnings distribution, and also relies on the information from the relatively few respondents in 
this sample who experience a marriage or cohabitation during the SIPP panel. As a robustness 
check, I conducted the same analyses presented in Table 3 for the subsample of women whose 
potential spouses’ earnings fall within the bottom half of the earnings distribution, where there 
are no significant differences between the actual and predicted spouse earnings. Results from this 
exercise are presented in Table 5. In each of the models, the magnitude of the effect of the 
expected loss in EITC benefits is similar or larger for the sub-sample of individuals in the bottom 
half of the spouses’ earnings distribution than for the sample as a whole. This suggests that the 
results presented in Table 3 are not driven solely by individuals matched to high-earning 
spouses. Since the maximum household earnings threshold for EITC eligibility is around 
$45,000, relatively small changes in household income could have substantial consequences for 
EITC eligibility—spouses earning more than $25,000 are likely to render most EITC-eligible 
women in this sample ineligible for the EITC entirely. Relatively small differences between the 
actual and predicted earnings of spouses are unlikely to have an impact on the magnitude of the 
expected EITC loss upon marriage, particularly for spouses in the top half of the earnings 
distribution.   
 
VII. Conclusion 
The EITC has been a widely popular program due to its success in lifting millions of 
households out of poverty.  It has been shown to dramatically increase the labor supply of single 
mothers (Ellwood 2000, Meyer and Rosenbaum 2000) and evidence suggests positive outcomes 
for child wellbeing (Dahl and Lochner 2012) and maternal health (Evans and Garthwaite 2010). 
Previous evidence on the effect of the EITC on marriage and divorce suggests small, negative 
impacts on marriage and virtually no impact on divorce (Dickert-Conlin and Houser 2000, 
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 Ellwood 2000, Herbst 2011). Previous studies, with the exception of a small analysis in Ellwood 
(2000) on cohabiting couples, have not attempted to account for potential spouse earnings in 
calculating the incentives or disincentives to marry.  Further, none of these studies have 
considered the effects of the EITC on cohabitation rates.   
Using a sample of single men from the SIPP, I predicted spouse earnings for a sample of 
single women in the SIPP who were eligible for the EITC.  Results show that most women 
eligible for the EITC can expect to lose some of their EITC benefits were they to marry. I find an 
expected loss of about $2,100 for women who expect to lose benefits upon marriage, an 80% 
decline in their pre-marriage EITC benefits. I find that a $1,000 expected loss in EITC benefits 
upon marriage increases the likelihood of cohabiting by 1.1 percentage points and decreases the 
likelihood of marrying by 1.8 percentage points.  Simulating changes in cohabitation and 
marriage rates using results from multinomial logistic regressions suggest that were there no 
marriage penalty in the EITC, the cohabitation rate among this sample would decline from 11 
percent to 10 percent and the marriage rate would increase from 14 percent to 16 percent.  
 The results of this analysis rely heavily on the calculation of the expected EITC losses 
associated with marriage. As many of the women in this sample do not marry over the course of 
the SIPP survey, spouse earnings are unobservable for the majority of the sample. To address 
this problem, I rely on data from the CPS sample of married women to predict the types of men 
women marry. There are inherently some assumptions made when predicting these potential 
spouses, namely that the sample of married women have similar marriage prospects as the single 
women. This is unlikely to be true, particularly as many of the single women eligible for the 
EITC have children, which may alter their marriage prospects significantly (Graefe and Lichter 
2007). Without having information on whether the married women in the CPS had children prior 
to the marriage, it is difficult to assess the impact of children on marriage matches. In addition, 
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 the CPS lacks information on the duration of the marriage, so a cross-section of existing 
marriages emphasizes more stable marriages. Despite these assumptions, the predicted spouse 
earnings distribution looks quite similar to the actual spouse earnings distribution for individuals 
for whom spouse earnings are observed in the SIPP, particularly for individuals in the bottom 
half of the earnings distribution. Results were consistent when excluding individuals predicted to 
marry spouses in the top half of the earnings distribution, where the predicted spouse earnings 
differed the most from the observed spouse earnings.  
Beyond the impact of expected losses in EITC benefits, there are other findings that also 
indicate a relationship between marriage and EITC benefits. Women living in states that 
supplemented the federal EITC were nearly 4 percentage points less likely to marry than women 
living in states without EITCs, suggesting that larger EITC benefits (and thus larger potential 
losses in EITC benefits) may be discouraging women from marrying. Expected spouse earnings 
play a role in marriage and cohabitation decisions as well.  A $1,000 increase in spouse earnings 
is associated with a 0.1 of a percentage point increase in the probability of marriage and a 0.2 of 
a percentage point decline in the probability of cohabiting by the end of the SIPP. This result fits 
in with literature analyzing the marriage patterns of low-income women, which suggests that 
women look for financial stability when looking for marriage partners (Blau, Kahn, and 
Waldfogel 2000; Edin and Kefalas 2005) but that the criteria for cohabitation is different from 
that of marriage (Smock, Manning, and Porter 2005).   
When conducting the same analysis on a sample of EITC-eligible women with some 
college or more educational attainment, I find no effect of EITC benefits on marriage and 
cohabitation decisions. This suggests that individuals who are likely more transient recipients of 
the EITC are less responsive to the marriage disincentives in the benefit structure, perhaps 
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 because they do not expect to receive the EITC for consecutive years.28 I also found no 
relationship between potential spouse earnings and the likelihood of marriage for the highly-
educated sample, which supports other findings that low-educated individuals may be more 
sensitive to intra-household divisions of earnings (Bertrand et al. 2013). 
 These results suggest that low-income single women with a high school degree or less are 
more likely to cohabit and less likely to marry their partners if they expect to lose EITC benefits 
upon marriage. If individuals could receive the same EITC benefit while married as they did 
when they were single, results from this analysis suggest that the cohabitation rate in this sample 
would drop by about 9%, and the marriage rate would increase by 14%. This suggests that EITC 
recipients do respond to financial incentives to marry or cohabit with their partners and the 
benefit structure of the EITC may be influencing these decisions. Further, as approximately 65 
percent of this sample of unmarried women would lose EITC benefits upon marriage, 
eliminating the marriage disincentives in the EITC benefit structure would likely affect the 
marriage and cohabitation decisions of millions of low-income families.   
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics by expected loss or gain of EITC benefits upon marriage, 18-50 year old EITC-
eligible women with a high school degree or less  
    
Smaller 
EITC 
upon 
marriage 
No Change 
in EITC 
upon 
marriage 
Larger 
EITC 
upon 
marriage All 
 Married by the end of the survey 
 
0.12 0.14 0.17 0.135 
 Cohabiting by the end of the survey 
 
0.11 0.12 0.11 0.115 
 Race/Ethnicity 
      White 
 
0.45 0.38 0.42 0.43 
 Black 
 
0.29 0.32 0.31 0.30 
 Hispanic 
 
0.23 0.26 0.23 0.23 
 Asian/Native American 
 
0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 
 Education 
      Less than a HS diploma 
 
0.29 0.36 0.35 0.31 
 High school graduate 
 
0.71 0.64 0.65 0.69 
 Household Characteristics 
      Proportion with no private health insurance 
 
0.45 0.57 0.67 0.51 
 Proportion never married 
 
0.51 0.59 0.58 0.54 
 Has children 
 
0.82 0.88 0.88 0.84 
 Number of children in household 
 
1.52 1.59 1.73 1.58 
 Age 
 
35.1 33.2 33.5 34.5 
 EITC (2011$) 
      Proportion living in a state with EITC 
 
0.32 0.33 0.32 0.32 
 
EITC under marriage 
 
              
580  
           
2,669  
           
3,309  
         
1,462  
 
EITC single 
 
           
2,710  
           
2,669  
           
1,903  
         
2,532  
 
Expected difference between EITC while single and 
EITC married (EITC(single)-EITC(married)) 
 
           
2,130                  -    -1,406 
          
1,070  
 Actual difference in EITC benefits upon marriage 
(for those who marry or cohabit) 
 
2020 
 
-597 
             
190  
 Earnings (2011$) 
      
Individual earnings 
 
         
13,884  
        
12,516  
          
3,516  
      
12,398  
 
Predicted spouse earnings 
 
         
34,123  
              
471  
           
9,627  
       
24,075  
 Actual spouse earnings (for those who marry or 
cohabit) 
         
19,570  
         
15,889  
         
15,336  
       
18,063  
 Spouse's income is volatile  
 
0.26 0.02 0.19 0.21 
 Respondent out-earns potential spouse 
 
0.25 1.00 0.45 0.40 
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 Number of Observations 
 
           
1,949  
              
425  
              
684  
          
3,058  
 Source: 2001, 2004, and 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation. Women with a high school degree or less  
eligible for the EITC in the first year of the survey, aged 18-50. All dollars are 2011$ 
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Table 2. Trends in EITC eligibility by SIPP survey, 18-50 year old women with less than college and 
positive EITC benefit in year 1 of survey 
 
2001 
SIPP 
 
2004 
SIPP 
 
2008 
SIPP 
EITC trends in year 1 of SIPP panel 
     EITC benefit  (unmarried 2011$) 2,513 
 
2,579 
 
2,512 
EITC benefit (married 2011$) 1,154 
 
1,375 
 
1,956 
      Expect to lose EITC benefits upon marriage 0.72 
 
0.66 
 
0.53 
Expected EITC loss (year 1 2011$) 1,360 
 
1,204 
 
551 
      Earnings in year 1 of SIPP panel 
     Respondent earnings (2011$) 11,270 
 
11,917 
 
11,962 
Respondent + potential spouse earnings (2011$) 33,649 
 
34,022 
 
32,585 
      Trends over the course of the SIPP panel 
     Ever lose EITC benefits over course of panel 0.82 
 
0.79 
 
0.67 
Number of years where loss is expected (out of 3) 1.75 
 
1.64 
 
1.28 
Total expected loss in EITC benefits over 3 years (2011$) 3,282 
 
3,006 
 
1,626 
Average annual expected loss in EITC benefits (2011$) 1,132 
 
1,087 
 
526 
      Union formation patterns 
     Cohabited by end of survey 0.10 
 
0.14 
 
0.11 
Married by end of survey 0.12 
 
0.12 
 
0.17 
      Number of Observations 988 
 
1142 
 
929 
 
Source: 2001, 2004, and 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation. Women with a high school degree or less  
eligible for the EITC in the first year of the survey, aged 18-50. All dollars are 2011$ 
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 Table 3. Results from Multinomial Logistic Regressions: Unmarried 18-50 year old EITC-eligible women with a high school degree or less  
 
Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 Model 4 
 
Cohabit   Marry   Cohabit   Marry   Cohabit   Marry   Cohabit   Marry   
  vs. Remain Single   vs. Remain Single   vs. Remain Single vs. Remain Single 
EITC 
                Expected EITC loss upon marriage 0.002   -0.007 ** 0.003 * -0.009 *** 0.009 *** -0.016 *** 0.011 ** -0.018 *** 
 
(.001) 
 
(.003) 
 
(.002) 
 
(.002) 
 
(.003) 
 
(.003) 
 
(.005) 
 
(.005) 
 EITC value  (in thousands) 
    
-0.003   0.007 *** -0.008 ** 0.013 *** -0.009 * 0.016   
  
  
  
(.003) 
 
(.002) 
 
(.004) 
 
(.003) 
 
(.005) 
 
(.006) 
 Live in a state with an EITC 
    
0.023 ** -0.039 ** 0.023 *** -0.040 ** 
   
  
     
(.0091) 
 
(.0156) 
 
(.009) 
 
(.016) 
     
Potential spouse earnings (in 
thousands) 
        
-0.002 *** 0.001 ** -0.002 ** 0.001   
         
(.001) 
 
(.001) 
 
(.001) 
 
(.001) 
 Spouse Earnings 'volatile' 
        
0.011   -0.009   0.013   -0.012   
         
(.009) 
 
(.01) 
 
(.0135) 
 
(.015) 
 Demographics 
                Age 
    
0.009 *** 0.004   0.009 *** 0.004   0.009   0.005   
     
(.0032) 
 
(.007) 
 
(.003) 
 
(.007) 
 
(.006) 
 
(.007) 
 Education (Ref= HS grad) 
                Less than high school degree 
    
0.025 ** -0.032 *** 0.025 ** -0.032 *** 0.029 ** -0.038 *** 
     
(.0104) 
 
(.007) 
 
(.01) 
 
(.007) 
 
(.013) 
 
(.015) 
 Race (ref = White) 
                Black 
    
-0.104 *** -0.065 *** -0.104 *** -0.065 *** -0.136 *** -0.065 *** 
     
(.0099) 
 
(.0102) 
 
(.01) 
 
(.01) 
 
(.017) 
 
(.017) 
 Hispanic 
    
-0.018 ** 0.023 *** -0.018 ** 0.024 *** -0.027 * 0.032 ** 
     
(.0077) 
 
(.0059) 
 
(.008) 
 
(.006) 
 
(.015) 
 
(.016) 
 Household characteristics 
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 Number of children in household 
    
-0.004   -0.001   -0.002   -0.005   -0.001   -0.007   
     
(.0058) 
 
(.0041) 
 
(.006) 
 
(.004) 
 
(.008) 
 
(.008) 
 Respondent has never been married 
    
0.060 *** -0.056 *** 0.059 *** -0.057 *** 0.065 *** -0.058   
     
(.0064) 
 
(.013) 
 
(.006) 
 
(.013) 
 
(.013) 
 
(.014) 
 Respondent has no private health insurance 
   
-0.031 ** -0.013   -0.029 ** -0.017   -0.034 *** -0.011 *** 
     
(.0132) 
 
(.0175) 
 
(.013) 
 
(.017) 
 
(.012) 
 
(.013) 
 
                 SIPP Panel (ref=2001) 
                2004 
    
0.026 ** -0.010   0.027 ** -0.011   0.031 ** -0.016   
     
(.013) 
 
(.008) 
 
(.013) 
 
(.008) 
 
(.014) 
 
(.015) 
 2008 
    
0.014   0.041 *** 0.018   0.036 ** 0.020   0.030 ** 
     
(.011) 
 
(.014) 
 
(.011) 
 
(.015) 
 
(.015) 
 
(.015) 
 State Fixed Effects 
            
X 
 
X 
 
                 Observations in each cell 349   421   349   421   349   421   349   421   
Total number of observations                         3,058                                         3,058                                          3,058                                         3,058  
Source: 2001, 2004, and 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation. Women with a high school degree or less  eligible for the EITC in the first year of the 
survey, aged 18-50. All dollars are 2011$ 
Note: Analytical marginal effects shown, indicator variables evaluated as a change from 0 to 1. Standard errors clustered at state level. *** indicates significant 
difference at p<.01, **  p<.05, * p<.10 
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 Table 4. Results from multinomial logistic regressions: Unmarried 18-50 year old EITC-eligible women. 
By level of educational attainment  
 
High school degree or less Some college or more 
 
Cohabit 
 
Marry 
 
Cohabit 
 
Marry 
   vs. Remain Single   vs. Remain Single 
Expected EITC loss upon marriage 0.009 *** -0.016 *** -0.002   0.003   
 
(.003) 
 
(.003) 
 
(.002) 
 
(.003) 
 EITC value  (in thousands) -0.008 ** 0.013 *** 0.004   -0.005   
 
(.004) 
 
(.003) 
 
(.002) 
 
(.004) 
 Potential spouse earnings (in thousands) -0.002 *** 0.001 ** 0.000   -0.001   
 
(.001) 
 
(.001) 
 
(.) 
 
(.001) 
 Spouse earnings 'volatile' 0.011   -0.009   0.005   -0.015   
 
(.009) 
 
(.009) 
 
(.008) 
 
(.009) 
 Live in a state with an EITC 0.023 *** -0.040 ** -0.006   -0.009   
 
(.009) 
 
(.016) 
 
(.006) 
 
(.007) 
 Demographics 
    
  
   Age 0.009 *** 0.004   0.004   0.012 *** 
 
(.003) 
 
(.007) 
 
(.003) 
 
(.003) 
 Education (Ref= HS grad) 
    
  
   Less than high school degree 0.025 ** -0.032 *** n/a 
 
n/a 
 
 
(.01) 
 
(.007) 
 
  
   Race (ref = White) 
    
  
   Black -0.104 *** -0.065 *** -0.056 *** -0.083 *** 
 
(.01) 
 
(.01) 
 
(.005) 
 
(.009) 
 Hispanic -0.018 ** 0.024 *** 0.007   -0.019 ** 
 
(.008) 
 
(.006) 
 
(.015) 
 
(.007) 
 Household characteristics 
    
  
   Number of children in household -0.002   -0.005   0.003   0.021 *** 
 
(.006) 
 
(.004) 
 
(.004) 
 
(.004) 
 Respondent has never been married 0.059 *** -0.057 *** 0.047 *** -0.048 *** 
 
(.006) 
 
(.013) 
 
(.008) 
 
(.013) 
 Respondent has no private health insurance -0.029 ** -0.017   0.005   -0.040 *** 
 
(.013) 
 
(.017) 
 
(.006) 
 
(.007) 
 SIPP Year Fixed Effects X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 Observations in each cell 349   421   856   1303   
Number of observations 3058 9628 
Source: 2001, 2004, and 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation. Women eligible for the EITC in the first 
year of the survey, aged 18-50. 
Note: Analytical marginal effects shown, indicator variables evaluated as a change from 0 to 1. Standard errors 
clustered at state level.  All values in 2011$. *** indicates significant difference at p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10 
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 Table 5. Results from Multinomial Logistic Regressions: Unmarried 18-50 year old EITC-eligible women with a high school degree or less; 
individuals matched to spouses in bottom half of income distribution 
 
Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
 
Cohabit   Marry   Cohabit   Marry   Cohabit   Marry   
  vs. Remain Single   vs. Remain Single   vs. Remain Single 
EITC 
            Expected EITC loss upon marriage 
(bottom half of earnings sample) 0.004   -0.013 * 0.007 * -0.015 ** 0.008 ** -0.015 ** 
 
(.003) 
 
(.007) 
 
(.004) 
 
(.007) 
 
(.004) 
 
(.007) 
 Demographic controls 
    
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
             Spouse earnings 
        
X 
 
X 
 
             SIPP Year Fixed Effects 
    
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
             Observations in each cell 199   225   199   225   199   225   
Total number of observations                        1,680                                      1,680                                      1,680  
Source: 2001, 2004, and 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation. Women with a high school degree or less  eligible for the EITC in the first 
year of the survey, aged 18-50. All dollars are 2011$ 
Note: Analytical marginal effects shown, indicator variables evaluated as a change from 0 to 1. Standard errors clustered at state level.  All values in 
2011$. *** indicates significant difference at p<.01, **  p<.05, * p<.10 
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Figure 2. Distribution of expected EITC loss (in thousands of dollars) among EITC-eligible 
women 
0
.2
.4
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si
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Expected change in EITC upon marriage: EITC(single)-EITC(Married)
 
Source: 2001, 2004, and 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation. Sample of women aged 18-50 who are 
eligible for the earned income tax credit and have a high school degree or less. Note: Positive values correspond to 
higher benefits while single than while married (an expected loss in EITC benefits upon marriage). Negative values 
correspond to higher EITC benefits upon marriage. Expected changes in benefits measured in thousands of 2011$.
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 Table A1. Characteristics of Spouses of Married Women in 2001, 2004 and 2008 SIPP, by Race and Education 
                               
                             
White, Non-Hispanic 
                             
                             
 
<HS HS 
 
19-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-49 50+ 19-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-49 50+ 
Observations       448        707        750        861     2,103     2,449     1,819     3,597     4,776     6,541  
    
16,243  
    
16,192  
       
  
     Spouse Characteristics 
     
  
     Spouse's Age 
      
  
     19-24 41.3% 5.1% 1.1% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 43.7% 4.2% 0.4% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 
25-29 39.5% 41.0% 8.4% 2.0% 0.3% 0.3% 39.7% 43.9% 7.2% 1.0% 0.2% 0.1% 
30-34 14.1% 33.1% 39.3% 5.0% 1.1% 0.4% 10.2% 36.3% 41.1% 7.9% 1.1% 0.2% 
35-39 3.6% 11.2% 32.8% 37.9% 7.6% 0.7% 2.9% 10.1% 35.7% 41.7% 5.7% 0.5% 
40-49 1.6% 7.4% 15.3% 46.8% 60.4% 8.4% 1.9% 4.7% 14.0% 44.6% 65.0% 8.0% 
50+ 0.0% 2.3% 3.1% 7.8% 30.5% 90.2% 1.5% 0.8% 1.7% 4.5% 27.9% 91.1% 
Spouse's Race 
      
  
     White 87.3% 88.3% 90.5% 93.4% 92.2% 95.0% 88.9% 90.7% 93.2% 93.6% 95.0% 95.6% 
Black 1.8% 1.6% 1.5% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 1.6% 1.8% 1.1% 1.2% 0.9% 0.6% 
Hispanic 8.5% 7.9% 6.1% 3.6% 4.4% 2.4% 7.2% 5.4% 3.8% 3.4% 2.6% 1.9% 
Other 2.5% 2.3% 1.9% 2.1% 2.6% 1.6% 2.3% 2.1% 1.9% 1.7% 1.6% 1.9% 
Spouse's 
Education 
      
  
     Less than HS 43.8% 44.0% 47.2% 41.2% 41.2% 41.5% 10.4% 9.0% 8.9% 9.0% 8.0% 9.2% 
High School Deg 44.2% 36.8% 37.5% 40.0% 40.0% 39.5% 62.7% 55.0% 58.2% 56.2% 55.3% 50.7% 
Some College 9.6% 15.8% 12.5% 14.1% 13.4% 14.3% 21.5% 27.2% 23.3% 22.8% 23.4% 24.9% 
College 2.5% 3.4% 2.8% 4.8% 5.5% 4.7% 5.3% 8.7% 9.6% 11.9% 13.3% 15.2% 
                          
Source: 2002-2011 CPS population of married women and their spouses, aged 18-65 
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Black Non-Hispanic 
                             
                             
 
<HS HS 
 
19-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-49 50+ 19-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-49 50+ 
Observations        59         72        104        141        366        589        147        356        489        642  
     
1,653  
     
1,680  
       
  
     Spouse Characteristics 
     
  
     Spouse's Age 
      
  
     19-24 39.0% 5.6% 2.9% 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 42.2% 5.1% 0.8% 0.5% 0.0% 0.1% 
25-29 28.8% 26.4% 5.8% 1.4% 0.5% 0.0% 33.3% 39.0% 10.8% 1.9% 0.5% 0.2% 
30-34 11.9% 40.3% 29.8% 5.7% 2.5% 0.3% 13.6% 27.2% 36.6% 12.0% 1.8% 0.5% 
35-39 10.2% 9.7% 26.0% 27.7% 9.8% 1.0% 3.4% 17.1% 28.4% 37.9% 7.4% 1.0% 
40-49 8.5% 13.9% 27.9% 55.3% 48.1% 9.0% 4.8% 8.1% 18.6% 40.2% 57.8% 10.1% 
50+ 1.7% 4.2% 7.7% 9.2% 39.1% 89.6% 2.7% 3.4% 4.7% 7.6% 32.6% 88.1% 
Spouse's Race 
      
  
     White 6.8% 5.6% 3.8% 5.7% 2.7% 1.7% 6.1% 5.9% 3.48% 4.05% 2.72% 2.26% 
Black 91.5% 90.3% 92.3% 92.2% 95.1% 96.6% 88.4% 92.4% 92.84% 92.99% 95.40% 96.49% 
Hispanic 1.7% 4.2% 2.9% 0.7% 1.4% 0.8% 2.0% 1.4% 2.66% 1.56% 1.33% 0.83% 
Other 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 1.4% 0.8% 0.8% 3.4% 0.3% 1.02% 1.40% 0.54% 0.42% 
Spouse's 
Education 
      
  
     Less than HS 44.1% 37.5% 39.4% 35.5% 43.7% 55.2% 8.8% 7.9% 7.98% 11.68% 10.28% 16.90% 
High School Deg 44.1% 44.4% 47.1% 48.9% 34.7% 34.0% 65.3% 58.4% 65.24% 60.59% 59.04% 55.24% 
Some College 6.8% 15.3% 11.5% 12.1% 14.8% 9.0% 20.4% 23.0% 16.97% 19.16% 22.69% 19.76% 
College 5.1% 2.8% 1.9% 3.5% 6.8% 1.9% 5.4% 10.7% 9.82% 8.57% 7.99% 8.10% 
                          
Source: 2002-2011 CPS population of married women and their spouses, aged 18-65 
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Hispanic 
                             
                             
 
<HS HS 
 
19-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-49 50+ 19-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-49 50+ 
Observations       834     1,560     2,160     2,100     3,140     2,253        793     1,403     1,669     1,627  
     
2,551  
     
1,878  
       
  
     Spouse Characteristics 
     
  
     Spouse's Age 
      
  
     19-24 30.2% 6.5% 1.2% 0.9% 0.3% 0.2% 39.8% 5.0% 1.1% 0.4% 0.1% 0.2% 
25-29 44.8% 35.5% 9.3% 2.4% 0.6% 0.1% 40.2% 41.9% 9.3% 1.5% 0.4% 0.3% 
30-34 15.7% 37.2% 37.8% 9.6% 3.3% 0.9% 14.2% 36.3% 42.8% 12.4% 2.8% 0.5% 
35-39 4.9% 14.1% 34.3% 40.3% 7.6% 1.2% 3.3% 12.1% 30.9% 43.2% 8.5% 1.0% 
40-49 2.9% 6.0% 15.5% 42.0% 59.5% 11.5% 1.6% 3.6% 14.4% 37.6% 64.1% 11.7% 
50+ 1.4% 0.7% 1.9% 4.9% 28.7% 86.0% 0.8% 1.1% 1.5% 5.0% 24.1% 86.4% 
Spouse's Race 
      
  
     White 3.36% 2.37% 1.99% 2.76% 3.22% 3.99% 10.47% 11.69% 11.74% 14.87% 20.27% 21.88% 
Black 0.84% 0.38% 0.19% 0.19% 0.25% 0.18% 0.76% 0.93% 1.86% 1.48% 1.45% 1.22% 
Hispanic 95.44% 96.79% 97.55% 96.71% 96.21% 95.47% 87.52% 86.10% 85.20% 82.48% 77.34% 74.60% 
Other 0.36% 0.45% 0.28% 0.33% 0.32% 0.36% 1.26% 1.28% 1.20% 1.17% 0.94% 2.29% 
Spouse's 
Education 
      
  
     Less than HS 71.82% 74.42% 75.28% 77.05% 75.10% 74.43% 29.26% 26.51% 23.07% 21.63% 20.34% 20.29% 
High School Deg 20.26% 18.65% 17.69% 15.29% 15.64% 15.31% 52.21% 53.60% 53.86% 54.33% 50.06% 47.02% 
Some College 5.64% 5.58% 5.19% 5.24% 6.43% 7.63% 13.87% 14.40% 16.18% 17.09% 19.33% 20.29% 
College 2.28% 1.35% 1.85% 2.43% 2.83% 2.62% 4.67% 5.49% 6.89% 6.95% 10.27% 12.41% 
                          
Source: 2002-2011 CPS population of married women and their spouses, aged 18-65 
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 CHAPTER 3 
FERTILITY PATTERNS OF COLLEGE GRADUATES BY FIELD OF STUDY, U.S. 
WOMEN BORN 1960—79 (WITH KELLY MUSICK) 
 
The fertility patterns of U.S. college graduates are increasingly distinct from those of 
women with lower levels of education. Whereas women of all education levels have postponed 
marriage, only college-educated women have delayed childbirth to the same extent as marriage 
(Ellwood and Jencks 2004; McLanahan 2004). The gap in age at first birth has grown, and by the 
end of their reproductive years, college-educated women are more likely to be childless and have 
fewer children overall (Rindfuss et al. 1996; Martin 2004; Musick et al. 2009). Investigators of 
family formation processes in the United States have tended to focus on the early childbearing of 
women with the lowest levels of education (e.g., Ribar 1999; Furstenberg 2003; Carlson et al. 
2004; Edin and Kefalas 2005), and there has been relatively little research on the pattern of later 
and lower fertility that is characteristic of U.S. college graduates. The continuing increase in 
college enrolments among women in the U.S. and other advanced industrialized countries 
(Buchmann and DiPrete 2006; Bhrolchain and Beaujouan 2012) makes it important to obtain a 
better understanding of variation in the effects of college study on family life. 
Different fields of undergraduate study lead to career trajectories that differ in their 
economic rewards, demands, and the relative importance of employment and family. For this 
reason, field of study might be expected to be an important factor in explaining fertility variation 
among college graduates, and research in Europe has already begun to explore this association 
(Lappegård 2002; Lappegård and Rønsen 2005; Hoem et al. 2006a, 2006b; Martín-García and 
Baizán 2006; Neyer and Hoem 2008; Van Bavel 2010). Studies there find that fertility is indeed 
highly stratified by field of study. Subsequent childbearing is at least as closely associated with 
field of study as level of education in Norway (Lappegård 2002; Lappegård and Rønsen 2005), 
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 Spain (Martín-García and Baizán 2006), and Sweden (Hoem et al. 2006a, 2006b). To our 
knowledge, no systematic investigation of links between field of study and fertility has been 
undertaken in the United States.  
In the study reported in this paper, we built on recent European research with the aim of 
obtaining a better understanding of variation in the fertility patterns of U.S. college-educated 
women. The expansion of women’s educational attainment and employment in the United States 
and Europe has unfolded in different labor markets and has been subject to different social 
policies. European welfare regimes are relatively generous in their support of women’s labor 
force participation, with such provisions as paid family leave, subsidized child care, and part-
time work (Gornick et al. 1997; Waldfogel 2001; Gornick and Meyers 2003). The United States 
ranks low in work-family support  policies, but there may be trade-offs in greater flexibility in 
labor markets, gender equality in access to jobs and pay, and cheaper private-sector child care 
(Morgan 2005; Mandel and Semyonov 2006; Pettit and Hook 2009; Mandel and Shalev 2009a, 
2009b). These trade-offs may favor college graduates (Mandel and Shalev 2009a, 2009b; Mandel 
2010). Despite weak support policies, labor force attachment and fertility rates in the U.S. remain 
high relative to those in Europe (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000; Morgan 2003; Morgan 2005; 
Misra et al. 2011). 
We drew on large, nationally representative samples from the 2001, 2004 and 2008 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to provide the first analysis of fertility 
differences between groups of U.S. college graduates by their undergraduate field of study. We 
used multilevel event-history models to investigate potential mechanisms linking field of study 
to delayed fertility and childlessness.  To explore institutional and selection processes, models 
included the following indicators: motherhood employment penalties; percentage of men in the 
field; early marriage (as measured by the SIPP); and early attitudes about family roles (as 
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 measured by the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, (NLSY79)). 
II. Background 
II.A How might field of study matter? 
A growing line of research focuses on the potential importance of institutional accommodations 
for easing the competing demands of work and family on women’s time (Bianchi 2000; Joshi 
2002; DiPrete et al. 2003; Morgan 2003; Rindfuss et al. 2003; Morgan and Taylor 2006). The 
idea is that the easier it is for women to combine motherhood and employment—rather than 
having to choose between them—the weaker the constraints on childbearing. Indeed, at the 
aggregate level, the long-held negative relationship between women’s labor force participation 
and completed fertility has reversed in developed countries: high rates of women’s participation 
in the labour force are now associated with high fertility (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000; Billari 
and Kohler 2004).  
Conditions that reduce work-family conflict include greater flexibility and smaller 
penalties for time spent outside the labor force (England 1992; Glass and Camarigg 1992; Goldin 
and Katz 2008b). We assessed workplace accommodations by measuring the differences in labor 
force participation between mothers with children aged under five, and all other women, by their 
field of study. We postulated that fields of study leading to jobs with smaller motherhood 
employment penalties would impose fewer constraints on childbearing and result in earlier and 
higher overall fertility. 
Institutional perspectives suggest causal mechanisms linking field of study and family 
formation patterns, but there are undoubtedly also selection processes at work. Hakim (2000) has 
emphasized the importance of heterogeneity in women’s lifestyle preferences—particularly the 
degree to which women are home or work-centered—for understanding women’s fertility 
decisions. She makes the following proposals: ‘home-centered’ women obtain education as a 
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 form of social capital; ‘work-centered’ women invest heavily in training geared specifically to 
careers; and a middle group of ‘adaptive’ women obtain education with a view to working, 
although investing less than the ‘work-centered’. The ‘adaptive’ group might particularly be 
expected to select fields of study based on their perception of the ease of balancing work and 
family obligations in the jobs characteristic of those fields. The extent to which women are 
family-centered may also be associated with individual characteristics. For example, nurturance 
and a preference for working with people might select women into such caring or helping 
professions as teaching, health, and social work (Fortin 2008; Folbre 2010). These selection 
processes may be reflected in the gender composition of fields and attitudes about family roles 
typical of fields. 
Any effects of field of study on fertility may be indirect, working through variation in age 
at marriage. Fertility remains closely associated with marriage among U.S. college graduates, 
with only 7 per cent of births in this group occurring outside marriage (Kennedy and Bumpass 
2011). Consequently, differences in marriage rates across fields of study may be a key factor in 
shaping variation in childlessness. Fields of study associated with less stable career trajectories 
or lengthier training periods may delay marriage (Oppenheimer et al. 1997), as might fields with 
weaker ties to particular jobs (Hoem et al. 2006b). Further, fields of study may provide different 
opportunities for marriage, either promoting or inhibiting it. For example, fields in which a high 
proportion of students are men may shape marriage prospects via the availability of prospective 
partners, with more prospective partners leading to earlier marriage and, in turn, childbearing. 
This suggests that the percentage of men in a field may reflect more than selection into fields; it 
also points to potential nonlinearities in the relationship between percentage of men and 
childbearing. 
II.B Previous research 
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 A handful of studies in Europe have explored the association between field of study and fertility. 
Hoem et al. (2006a, 2006b) found that Swedish women who studied health and teaching had 
lower rates of childlessness and higher overall fertility than women who studied in other fields. 
Similarly, studies in Austria (Neyer and Hoem 2008), Norway (Lappegård 2002; Lappegård and 
Rønsen 2005), and Spain (Martín-García and Baizán 2006) all found earlier and higher overall 
fertility among women in fields of study related to caring or helping professions. As a factor in 
differentiating fertility, field of study generally seems to be equally or more important than 
educational level. For example, among Swedish women with the equivalent of a college degree, 
10 per cent of those who had graduated in health and teaching were childless, whereas the largest 
proportion childless amongst all other fields of study was 30 per cent, a difference of 20 
percentage points. The maximum difference in childlessness across educational levels was only 5 
percentage points (13 per cent among those with less than a high school education and 18 per 
cent among those with high tertiary education, or college degrees). In contrast, among U.S. 
women aged 40–44 in 2008, the difference in childlessness across educational levels was 
substantially higher at 9 percentage points: 15 per cent of those without a high school degree 
were childless, compared with 24 per cent of those with a college degree (U.S. Census Bureau 
2010). 
 European data show that childlessness is highest among women who studied the arts and 
humanities, followed by those who studied the social sciences, and mid-range for women in 
science and technology (Lappegård 2002; Hoem et al. 2006b; Neyer and Hoem 2008). There is 
much concern in the U.S. over the small proportion of women in science and technology, and 
considerable debate over how family roles and preferences influence behavior (Ceci and 
Williams 2007; Ceci et al. 2009; Sassler et al. 2011; Morgan et al. 2013). Women graduating in 
disciplines with large concentrations of men are generally more likely to remain childless and 
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 tend to have fewer births on average, although there are exceptions. Hoem et al. (2006b) has 
suggested that the relatively weak ties to future occupations in the arts and humanities (which 
typically offer no special job training or teaching qualifications) might explain the high rates of 
childlessness in these fields, despite their relatively high levels of female representation. How the 
fertility experiences of U.S. women in science and technology fields compare with those of 
European women is unknown. 
Van Bavel (2010) further explored how field of study relates to fertility postponement 
across 21 European countries, focusing on percentage of men, family attitudes, and earnings 
potential as mechanisms linking field of study to fertility. Using multilevel conditional 
probability models with women cross-classified by country and field of study, his analysis found 
childbearing at earlier ages among those who had graduated in fields of study characterized by a 
higher representation of women and more traditional family attitudes. It also found later 
childbearing among women in fields of study with higher earnings potential (as indicated by the 
expected starting wage and the steepness of the rise in earnings with age), a finding consistent 
with the hypothesis that higher wages mean higher income forgone in the event of childbirth, and 
thus higher opportunity costs of having children. While a significant factor in Van Bavel’s study 
of women across educational levels and countries, we expected wages to play a weaker role in 
differentiating fertility by field of study among our sample of U.S. college graduates, for whom 
wages were relatively homogeneous (this was borne out by sensitivity tests that included 
information on wages by field of study).  
In sum, evidence from Europe suggests that fertility differences by field of study are 
driven by a mixture of both causal and selection effects. That is, field of study appears to have a 
causal effect on attitudes and career prospects (and, in turn, fertility behavior), and women 
appear to be selected into fields of study by their attitudes about family life. Women’s attitudes 
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 evolve with age and experience (Thornton et al. 1983; Fan and Marini 2000), and Van Bavel’s 
measure of family attitudes was assessed while men and women were in college, when their 
attitudes were possibly already shaped by the different social environments of fields of study. 
We know of no general investigation of the relationship between undergraduate field of 
study and fertility in the U.S. The closest is work by Goldin and colleagues, which documented 
fertility differences among elite college graduates by advanced degree and career trajectory. 
Comparing three cohorts of women who had graduated from Harvard with advanced degrees, 
they found that family size was generally smallest for those with a doctorate, and largest for 
physicians (Goldin and Katz 2008b). Physicians took the shortest time off after having a child 
and experienced the smallest loss of earnings for time off. Goldin reported similar results from 
the College and Beyond data, which included graduates who entered a broader set of selective 
colleges in 1976 (Goldin 2006). She and Katz concluded (2008b, p.7) that ‘women in careers 
with the greatest predictability and the smallest financial penalty for time out have the most 
children’. Characteristics of careers are more directly related to the factors that could ease or 
exacerbate work-family conflict than fields of study. At the same time, careers are established 
much further into the life course, and decisions about what job to take or even whether to work 
may be affected by family formation. Our focus on field of study allows us to examine part of 
the career process that takes place well before the birth of the first child for the vast majority of 
college graduates.  
 Given the lack of research on the relationship between field of study and fertility in the 
U.S., how might one expect that relationship to compare with the findings for Europe? As noted 
above, the United States ranks low relative to Europe in work-family support policies, such as 
paid leave and subsidized child care, but high in labor market flexibility (e.g., Gornick and 
Meyers 2003; Mandel and Semyonov 2006). An unintended consequence of paid-leave policies 
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 appears to be lower wages and greater occupational segregation by gender, which 
disproportionately affect highly skilled women (Mandel 2010; Misra et al. 2011). The prospect 
of motherhood may thus be less constraining to U.S. college graduates than to their counterparts 
in the more developed welfare states of Western Europe. The U.S. educational system is also less 
rigid, lacking the strong vocational and apprenticeship programs of many of the European 
systems (Goldin and Katz 2008a; Mandel and Shalev 2009). The more general approach to 
education and to the greater overall flexibility in job opportunities in the United States suggest 
that fields of study there might be less tied to specific occupational characteristics, potentially 
resulting in smaller differences in fertility patterns among undergraduate fields of study. 
II.C Our approach 
We explored how field of study relates to fertility delay and childlessness among U.S. college-
educated women, relying primarily on data from the SIPP. Our investigation of potential 
mechanisms linking field of study to fertility included measures of selection processes discussed 
in past European work, as well as indicators of institutional accommodations not examined 
elsewhere. Our analyses focused on college graduates because there is little educational 
specialization before college enrolment in the U.S. (the European studies mentioned above 
included women of different education levels). Data from the SIPP were available on the timing 
of first births to women only, precluding analysis of men’s fertility. The SIPP was well suited to 
our study, with samples large enough to investigate variation by field of study and also to 
provide detailed information on fertility, education, earnings, employment, and marriage. 
We start with a descriptive background and then explore the potential factors linking field 
of study with family formation. We estimated discrete-time multilevel event-history models of 
first birth among women aged 20–48 as a function of individual-level socio-demographic 
variables and field of study-level characteristics. Most of the latter were generated from data on 
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 women aged 21–55 years in the SIPP, including motherhood employment penalties, percentage 
of men, and early marriage. Family role attitudes were assessed using data from the NLSY79, a 
panel survey of 14–21-year-olds that began in 1979. Attitudes were observed at the first wave of 
data collection, before college enrolment for most, and thus largely before respondents were 
influenced by their experiences in particular fields. Thus we had a relatively good measure of 
attitudes as a selection factor into fields of study. We further explored the role of differences 
across fields in marriage timing (per cent married by age 26) in explaining differences in the 
timing of first births. Finally, we used our model results to predict how the proportion childless 
would change when varying field-of-study-level characteristics. 
Our data and modeling approach allowed us to examine the institutional, selection, and 
intervening variables perspectives outlined earlier. These were our starting hypotheses: (1) 
Institutional accommodations that reduce the cost of combining motherhood with employment 
may weaken constraints on childbearing, implying that smaller motherhood employment 
penalties are positively associated with the transition to a first birth. (2) Women may select into 
fields of study on the basis of characteristics that also predict earlier transitions to motherhood; 
for example, traditional family values may lead to earlier first births and draw women to the 
(female-dominated) caring and helping fields. The percentage of men in a field may further 
reflect partner availability, potentially resulting in nonlinearities in the relationship between field 
of study and fertility.  (3) Marriage timing may play a mediating role in the link between field of 
study and fertility; in particular, the proportion of women married by age 26 is likely to be 
associated with earlier births. These processes need not be competing; each may be occurring 
simultaneously, some potentially offsetting, and others reinforcing. Of course, our measures are 
only rough proxies; we discuss their limitations in greater detail in the discussion section. 
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 III. Data and method 
III.A Survey of Income and Program Participation 
The SIPP is a multi-part survey conducted in the U.S. every four months through in-person 
interviews with all individuals aged over 15 in the household (U.S. Census Bureau 2009). For the 
rounds of the survey we used, the number of households and the periods over which they were 
followed were as follows: 36,700 over 36 months in 2001; 46,500 over 48 months in 2004; 
52,000 households over 40 months in 2008. The primary purpose of the SIPP is to gather 
information about sources of household income, but information on specific topics is also 
collected in separate modules. We relied on the second module for retrospective fertility and 
marital histories. Also included in the module were details of schooling, including degrees 
attained, timing of degree completion, and characteristics of educational programs. SIPP person-
weights account for differential non-response and panel attrition and were applied in all 
descriptive analyses. 
We restricted our analysis to women respondents born 1960–79 (aged 20–48 at 
interview) who had completed a four-year college degree by age 25 and were childless at the 
completion of their degree. (Characteristics of the field of study were generated from more 
general samples, described in greater detail below). Excluding women who did not finish their 
degree by age 25 resulted in a loss of about 15 per cent of the sample of women with college 
degrees, and excluding those who had their first child before completing their degree resulted in 
an additional loss of 5 per cent. These exclusions resulted in a sample of women with college 
degrees who were slightly more educationally advantaged than the overall population of women 
with college degrees, which somewhat limited the representativeness of our results, but ensured 
that the field of study was completed before the first birth. Pooling sample numbers from the 
2001, 2004 and 2008 SIPPs yielded a total sample of 8,895 women. We transformed the dataset 
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 into a file of person-years at risk for our event-history analysis, with one record for every year of 
age from degree to first birth, giving a total of 79,664 person-years. 
The 1960–79 birth cohort provided a large sample of women with college degrees and 
allowed us to follow some to the end of their fertile years. At the same time, this 20-year span 
represents a fairly recent snapshot of college graduates and their fertility. The oldest of them 
were coming of age in the late 1970s, when increases in college enrolment, labor force 
participation, fertility postponement, and childlessness were well under way (Bianchi 2000; 
Martin 2004; Goldin et al. 2006). We did not consider earlier cohorts whose experiences in 
school, work, and family were quite different (Goldin 2004). 
III.B National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) 
The NLSY79 is a nationally representative panel survey that has followed nearly 13,000 men 
and women aged 14–21 in 1979, representing the 1958–65 birth cohort (U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 2008). The NLSY79 includes attitudinal questions that are not in the SIPP, but the 
sample sizes are considerably smaller (with just 1,258 women college graduates), making it 
difficult to examine fertility patterns even for broad fields of study. Supplementing our main data 
file with data on attitudes by field of study from the NLSY79 allowed us to combine its detail 
with the large samples of the SIPP. We used a sample of 3,572 women who reported a college 
field of study by the 2008 wave. We aggregated the more detailed fields of study reported in the 
NLSY79 to match SIPP definitions.  
III.C Measures  
Fertility. Women aged over 15 were asked the number of children ever born and the year of their 
first and most recent births. Lacking information on the timing of men’s fatherhood or women’s 
intermediate births (between the first and the most recent), our analysis was restricted to 
women’s first births. 
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 Field of study. Individuals who had completed a bachelor’s degree indicated which of 18 major 
fields of study they had undertaken in school. We eliminated individuals in the pre-professional 
fields of study, whose numbers were too small to analyze separately. We included data on the 
remaining 17 specific fields of study in our final models to maximize variation but aggregated 
them into 7 broader categories to present descriptive patterns: arts and humanities; education; 
general studies; health sciences; private and public administration; science and technology; and 
social sciences (see detailed description of fields in the Appendix). These broad categories are 
consistent with definitions from past work (Hoem et al. 2006a, 2006b; Neyer and Hoem 2008; 
Van Bavel 2010). One limitation with this categorization, also pointed out in European studies, is 
that we were able to identify women in teaching only if they had graduated in education. It is 
possible that women in other fields, such as history or English, subsequently attained teaching 
qualifications. 
Characteristics of field of study. We aggregated the data on working-age college graduates (aged 
21–55) from the 2001, 2004, and 2008 SIPPs to generate all the field-of study-level variables 
except family role attitudes (which we derived from the NSLY79). The ‘motherhood 
employment penalty’ was measured as the  difference between the percentage of labor force 
participation of mothers with children aged under five and that of women with no children under 
five. Percentage of men was measured simply as the percentage of men having graduated in a 
given field of study, and we included the squared percentage of men in the field as well to allow 
for a curvilinear association between percentage of men in the field and women’s fertility. 
Finally, the timing of early marriage was assessed by the percentage of women married by age 
26. 
We derived a measure of family role attitudes specific to field of study from NLSY79 
women reporting a field of study. Relevant questions were asked in 1979 and 1982; we relied on 
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 the answers to the 1979 questions but substituted 1982 responses if missing. Respondents were 
asked to indicate their agreement with the following, ranging from 1 = strongly disagree, to 4 = 
strongly agree: a woman’s place is in the home, not the office or shop; a wife with a family has 
no time for outside employment; employment of wives leads to more juvenile delinquency; it is 
much better if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home 
and family; men should share the work around the house with women; and women are much 
happier if they stay home and take care of children. We reverse-coded the item referring to men 
sharing work around the house, omitted individuals who failed to answer 3 or more of the 6 
items, and averaged over given answers to produce an index of traditional family role attitudes 
(estimated reliability of α = 0.91), with higher values corresponding to more traditional family 
role attitudes. We used the standardized version of this index in the multivariate models to 
facilitate interpretation, so that change was measured in standard-deviation units. Because this 
measure came from a different survey with smaller sample sizes than the main survey, it is likely 
measured with more error, which may attenuate estimated effects. Women in the NLSY79 
sample were also slightly older than the women in our main sample. As attitudes were becoming 
more progressive over this period (Thornton et al. 1983), we may have captured somewhat more 
traditional family role attitudes in data from the NLSY79. Nonetheless, barring rapid differential 
change in attitudes across fields, our measure should capture relevant differences between fields 
of study. Finally, we used a larger sample of college-goers (3,572), rather than of college 
graduates (1,258), to estimate family role attitudes for each field of study, so providing more 
stable estimates; the results were not sensitive to this slight change in definition.  
Individual-level demographic controls. We generated time-invariant indicators of the 
respondent’s race and ethnicity: non-Hispanic White; non-Hispanic Black; and Hispanic. We 
also constructed a time-invariant quantitative variable for the year in which the respondent 
109 
 
 obtained her bachelor’s degree to account for cohort differences in fertility patterns. 
III.D Multilevel event-history model 
We examined the timing of first birth with a discrete-time multilevel event-history model that 
nests individual person-years within field of study. Our baseline duration was a function of age, 
specified as categories to allow for flexibility in fertility patterns by age: 20–24; 25–29; 30–34; 
35–39; and 40 and over. All models included time-invariant individual-level controls 
(race/ethnicity and year of degree) and field-of-study-level motherhood employment penalties, 
percentage of men,and family role attitudes. Some models included field-of-study-level 
indicators of marriage timing. The model used can be written as a basic logistic function, in 
terms of the log odds of a first birth:  
ln [(pijt / (1 - pijt)] = γ00 + γ1At + γ2Xij + γ3Zj + υ0j    (1) 
where pijt is the probability that individual i, in field of study j, has a first birth in person-year t;  
At is a vector representing the five age categories specified above; Xij is a vector representing our 
time-invariant individual-level controls; and Zj is a vector of field-level characteristics. These 
covariates are represented by fixed slopes γ1, γ2, and γ3, respectively. The element γ00 is an overall 
intercept term, and υ0j is a field-specific random error term with variance , intended to capture 
heterogeneity across fields of study unexplained by our covariates (Teachman 2011). 
We generated model-based predicted probabilities to illustrate results in a more intuitive 
way than is possible with logits or odds ratios. Applying the estimated coefficients and sample 
means to a transformation of equation (1), we calculated age-specific predicted probabilities of 
first birth. We then multiplied these conditional probabilities together to yield the predicted 
probability of ever having a first birth—the complement being the probability of being childless. 
In this way, we can show differences in both the timing and incidence of childbearing across 
fields of study. Using results from full models pooled over fields of study, we altered the values 
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 of the field-of-study-level covariates to simulate variation in the proportions permanently 
childless. These simulations add further detail to the substantive key findings. 
IV. Results 
IV. A Descriptive results 
First birth timing and incidence. We ran field-of-study-specific discrete-time event-history 
models of first birth to explore differences in the timing of fertility among women using our 
main sample (timely college graduates born 1960–79, aged 20–48 at interview, and childless on 
graduating). We regressed the logit of first birth on a cubic term for age to impose some structure 
on our descriptive results (weighting models and including no other controls). We used model 
estimates as described above to generate predicted age-specific probabilities of first birth. Figure 
1 shows predicted probabilities of childlessness at age 44 by field of study. The smallest 
predicted probabilities of childlessness occur for women in education and health, at 16.4 and 
18.5 per cent, respectively. The largest probabilities occur for women in the arts and humanities 
(25.2) and general studies (26.4 per cent). Childlessness among women in administration (22 per 
cent), science and technology (22.1 per cent), and social sciences (23.1 per cent) take 
intermediate values. Differences are generally statistically significant across these three 
groupings, and overall patterns are similar to those found in Europe. The overall predicted rate of 
childlessness is 22.4 per cent. This estimate is reasonably close to the value of 24 per cent for the 
proportion childless among U.S. college graduates, as estimated from the CPS (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2010). The difference between the two estimates reflects differences in measurement; in 
our study, the probability is a period-based estimate derived by cumulating age-specific rates of 
first birth over the childbearing years, whilst the estimate derived from the CPS is a cohort one, 
based on completed fertility of women aged 40-44 in 2008. (The estimate derived in the present 
study therefore reflects the fertility of slightly earlier cohorts). 
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 Figure 2 gives more detail on how age-specific rates of first birth cumulate to estimates 
of the eventual proportions with children, and those without them, at age 44. Women in 
education and health make the earliest transitions to first birth, with higher birth probabilities 
than other college graduates until their early 30s, when probabilities fall and attain a rate of 
increase similar to that of other fields of study. Still, because these women start childbearing 
earlier, they remain more likely than others to have had a child at each age and less likely to be 
childless at age 44. Women who studied science and technology and public administration 
appear to have low probabilities of first births early on but relatively high probabilities in their 
mid to late 30s, resulting in moderate levels of childlessness. Women who completed degrees in 
arts and humanities also have fewer births in the early years, but without any obvious ‘catch up’ 
later. From regression models (not reported here), we found that women in science and 
administration have a significantly smaller chance of having a first birth than women in 
education, but only for ages under 30. In contrast, women in all other fields of study have 
significantly smaller chances at all ages of having a first birth than women in education. 
 
Field characteristics. Table 1 summarizes the key characteristics of the different fields of study 
that might account for the association between field of study and fertility: motherhood 
employment penalties; percentage of men; and traditional family attitudes.  
If those fields of study associated with higher fertility (i.e., education and health) are 
more accommodating of a work-family balance, we would expect to see smaller employment 
penalties for having young children, i.e., a smaller gap in employment between mothers with 
young children and other women. The data partly confirm this expectation: the penalty is 
smallest for health (9.2 percentage points), followed by education (12.3 percentage points). The 
education and health fields of study are heavily dominated by women (sixth row, Table 1), with 
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 men accounting for only 22.9 and 20.7 per cent of degrees, respectively. In contrast, the science 
and technology field is heavily dominated by men, who earn 70.6 per cent of such degrees. 
Except for the difference between education and health, all differences in percentage of men 
among broad fields are statistically significant. We found that the percentage of men in a given 
field of study correlated positively with traditional family role attitudes characteristic of fields, 
with education and health (the most women-dominated fields) also scoring highest on traditional 
attitudes (1.98). Women in general studies, private and public administration, science and 
technology, and social sciences are all significantly less traditional than women on average in 
their family attitudes.  Finally, women in education and health were more likely to be married by 
age 26: 54.4 and 46.4 per cent, respectively. These figures are significantly higher than the 37 to 
39 per cent of women married by age 26 in all other fields, consistent with the earlier first births 
and lower levels of childlessness in education and health. 
IV.B Multivariate results 
Table 2 gives the odds ratios from our discrete-time multilevel event -history models. Odds 
ratios indicate how changes in a given covariate are associated with changes in the odds of 
having a first birth, with values above 1 indicating a positive association and those below 1 a 
negative association. The top panel shows covariates at the individual level, including age, 
degree year, and race and ethnicity. The bottom panel shows field of study-level characteristics 
for 17 specific fields (rather than the 7 broad fields used in our descriptive summary, above). 
Table 2 presents the results of three models: Model 1 includes only demographic information at 
the individual level, Model 2 includes our key field-of-study-level variables, and Model 3 adds 
indicators of early marriage. All models include a random effect at the field-of-study level to 
allow for unobserved correlations within fields of study, and the associated standard deviation 
(shown at the bottom of Table 2) represents heterogeneity across fields unexplained by controls. 
113 
 
 Socio-demographic variables in Model 1 operate as expected (and change little across 
models): the odds of a first birth are largest for women aged 30 to 34, and Hispanic graduates are 
1.3 times more likely to have a first birth at any given age than non-Hispanic Whites (with the 
odds for Blacks being statistically insignificantly different from those for Whites). Adding 
characteristics of the fields of study in Model 2, we find that motherhood employment penalties 
are not significantly associated with the odds of having a first birth: that is, our measure of work-
family inflexibility does not, contrary to our expectation, appear to constrain family formation. 
Model 2 shows a statistically significant association between the percentage of men in a given 
field of study and the odds of a first birth. The association, however, is not linear: the results for 
the percentage of men suggest that the concentration of men in a field of study is negatively 
associated with the probability of having a first birth, but that the strength of the association 
declines at higher concentrations. As expected, we also find a positive association between 
traditional family attitudes and first-birth probabilities. A one-standard-deviation increase in 
traditional attitudes is associated with a 6 per cent increase in the odds of a first birth. 
Finally, Model 3 adds the indicator for marriage timing for each field of study, to 
examine the extent to which field characteristics are associated with fertility through the 
intervening life event of marriage. Not surprisingly, the proportion married by age 26 is 
positively associated with the odds of having a first birth. After accounting for the timing of 
marriage, the coefficient on the percentage of men in the field of study becomes statistically 
insignificant, and the coefficient for traditional family attitudes becomes smaller (although 
remaining statistically significant). These findings suggest that these mechanisms may indeed 
operate at least partly through differences in marriage timing; in particular, it appears that 
marriage is important in accounting for the association between the percentage of men in a field 
and fertility. 
114 
 
 As noted, all models include a random effect at the field-of-study level to allow for 
unobserved heterogeneity within fields of study, and standard deviations of this term are 
presented at the bottom of Table 2. With no field-of-study-level controls, the standard deviation 
of the random intercept at the field level is 0.14. Once we add our key field-level controls in 
Model 2, the standard deviation falls to 0.078, indicating that field-level characteristics account 
for about one half of the variation across fields of study. Finally, once we include the proportion 
of women married by age 26, the standard deviation falls to 0.023, indicating that our field-level 
controls account for the vast majority of the variation in the timing of first births across fields of 
study. By comparison, in a model controlling for age, education, and a country-level intercept, 
but no field characteristics, Van Bavel (2010) reported a field-level standard deviation of 0.22, 
which changed little with additional field-level controls. The contrast provides some evidence of 
stronger field-level differences in Europe than in the U.S., but the difference may be explained 
by Van Bavel’s broader sample of women across education levels and countries.  
IV.C Simulations 
To illustrate our findings in more intuitive terms, we ran simulations of childlessness based on 
Model 2 (Table 2) results, before marriage was included as an intervening variable. For each of 
our significant field-level variables, we predicted levels of childlessness at age 44, varying field-
level characteristics at their minimum, median, and maximum values, and holding all other 
covariates at their mean values. Figure 3 illustrates the results of this exercise. Modeling the 
percentage of men as a quadratic captures the non-linear relationship between the percentage of 
men in a field and the timing of the first birth. There is a larger proportion of childless women in 
fields with the median percentage of men than in fields of study with either the minimum (health: 
21 per cent men) or the maximum  (engineering: 86 per cent men). The difference in 
childlessness between fields at the minimum and maximum values of percentage men is only 2 
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 percentage points, while the difference between fields at the minimum and the median values is 
nearly 9 percentage points. There is a larger difference in proportions childless by family role 
attitudes: a difference of 13 percentage points between those fields of study with the least and 
those with the most traditional attitudes about family roles. 
V. Discussion 
We set out to examine variation in the timing and occurrence of first births among U.S. college 
graduates by undergraduate field of study and, further, to explore mechanisms by which field of 
study might influence fertility. To our knowledge, this was the first study to provide an analysis 
of childbearing patterns by field of study in the U.S. 
In initial analyses, we found significant differences in the timing and occurrence of first 
births across fields of study. Women who studied education and health were the earliest to have a 
first birth, while women in science and technology appeared to follow a pattern of delay and 
catch-up. The smallest proportion childless at age 44 were women in education and health, for 
whom the proportion was 10 percentage points smaller than for graduates in arts and humanities 
and general studies. The proportions childless for women in science and technology, social 
studies, and administration took intermediate values. These patterns are consistent with those 
reported in Europe (Lappegård 2002; Hoem et al. 2006b; Neyer and Hoem 2008), though we 
were surprised by the relatively large probabilities of first birth for women in science and 
technology, a field of study dominated by men, where the sex imbalance receives considerable 
attention and sparks much debate in the United States (e.g. Ceci and Williams 2007). 
We estimated multilevel event-history models to assess the importance of field-of-study 
characteristics in accounting for individual-level variation in becoming a mother. We postulated 
that fields of study leading to jobs with smaller motherhood penalties—measured by differences 
in employment between women with young children and all other women—should impose fewer 
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 constraints on childbearing.  These smaller penalties may reflect workplace accommodations that 
make it easier to combine work and family, and overall, penalties may signal to childless women 
information about the career costs of childbearing. We found little support for these possibilities, 
at least as modeled, with no significant association between motherhood employment penalties 
and first-birth timing.  
We used the percentage of men within fields study and traditional family role attitudes 
typical of fields of study as proxies for individual characteristics like nurturance, preferences for 
working with people, and a pro-family orientation that potentially select women both into the 
‘caring’ fields and earlier motherhood. Our measure of family role attitudes (derived from the 
NLSY79) was assessed early in the life course (at ages 14-21), largely before any potential 
influence of experiences in fields of study on attitudes, thus providing a reasonably 
straightforward selection criterion. Because this measure was generated from a different data 
source than our main sample, it was probably measured with more error, which would have 
tended to attenuate estimated effects. We nevertheless found that traditional family role attitudes 
were strongly associated with earlier age of first birth, with simulations showing a 13 percentage 
point difference in the proportions childless between the least traditional and the most traditional 
fields of study, ceteris paribus. Differences remained statistically significant after including 
controls for marriage patterns by field of study. 
The percentage of men within a field of study was also significantly associated with first-
birth timing, although both the pattern and interpretation of the association were somewhat more 
complicated. We found a curvilinear relationship: childlessness was greater in fields with 
intermediate percentages of men than in fields with either a small or a large percentage. The 
curvilinear pattern is consistent with larger probabilities of first birth among women in science 
and technology, a field heavily dominated by men (over 70 per cent), than among women in such 
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 fields as arts and social sciences in which the percentages of men are intermediate (about 40 per 
cent). Van Bavel (2010) reported a negative relationship between proportion of men and age at 
first birth across Europe, but no account was taken of potential nonlinearities. Exceptions to the 
general rule of higher fertility in more women-dominated fields have been discussed elsewhere 
(e.g., Hoem 2006b). We noted earlier the possibility that a large proportion of men may reflect 
selection processes, but may also mean greater partner availability and a marriage market that 
clears more quickly for women. For example, the presence of a large number of men with similar 
interests may result in women in science and technology marrying earlier than women in fields 
with smaller numbers of male graduates. Approximately 40 per cent of women in science and 
technology were married by age 26—larger than the proportions in arts and humanities, general 
studies, or social sciences.  The proportion of men in a field of study could also reflect 
differences, not taken into account by other controls, in the association between field and 
subsequent career. For example, a positive association between field of study and predictable, 
stable career paths might explain the relatively small proportion childless among women in 
science and technology (despite its small proportion of women) (Hoem 2006b; Goldin and Katz 
2008b).  
  Our results suggest that marriage timing plays an important role in mediating the link 
between field of study and fertility, with early marriage associated with earlier first births. Early 
marriage appears to account fully for the relationship between the percentage of men in a field of 
study and fertility: controlling for the proportion married by age 26 in Model 3 made  
the coefficient on the percentage of men statistically insignificant. The coefficient on family-role 
attitudes for fields of study fell in magnitude, although it remained statistically significant. Of 
course, given the very low rate of non-marital fertility among U.S. college graduates, it is not 
surprising that field-of-study characteristics operate substantially through marriage timing.  
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 The United States ranks low relative to Europe in work-family support policies, such as 
paid leave and subsidized child care, but high in terms of flexibility of educational systems and 
labor markets (e.g., Gornick and Meyers 2003; Mandel and Semyonov 2006, 2009; Goldin and 
Katz 2008a). But despite these differences, our findings are largely in line with European studies 
(e.g. Hoem et al. 2006a, 2006b, Neyer and Hoem 2008, Van Bavel 2010). That is, the pattern of 
childlessness across fields of study is similar, although the differences between the fields of 
study appear to be smaller in the U.S. For example, in the U.S., the smallest estimated 
proportions childless were among women in education and health (16.4 and 18.5 per cent, 
respectively) and the largest were for women in the arts (25.2 per cent) and general studies (26.4 
per cent), resulting in a difference across fields of study of 10 percentage points.  By contrast, the 
analogous comparison in Sweden is approximately 10 per cent childless in education and health 
and 30 per cent in the arts and humanities, giving a difference of 20 percentage points (Hoem et 
al 2008b).  
We have relied on informative data with relatively large samples to provide the best 
evidence to date on U.S. fertility differences across fields of study and on plausible explanatory 
mechanisms. Nevertheless, there are limitations in the data and the approach. We found some 
support for institutional and selection mechanisms, but causal pathways were difficult to identify. 
The SIPP contains limited individual-level variables relevant to fertility decisions, and 
unobserved factors may have confounded our estimated associations. The field-of-study 
measures we derived were merely proxies for factors that might explain how field of study 
influences fertility. For example, we used motherhood employment penalties to assess 
institutional features of the occupations characteristic of each particular field of study, but a more 
detailed examination would need to include more direct indicators, such as parental leave policy, 
job flexibility, and other aspects of working conditions (not measured by the SIPP). Further, field 
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 of study characteristics are themselves largely proxies for future career paths. It is likely that 
fields of study differ in the heterogeneity of occupations chosen after graduation. 
Relatively little research has been devoted to the increasingly distinctive fertility of U.S. 
college graduates. Our findings lend support to the notion that women’s choice of field of study 
is based on factors that simultaneously predict earlier motherhood, namely, traditional family 
values. Our findings also highlight the importance of marriage timing in accounting for 
differences in fertility across fields of study. This analysis serves as a starting point for a better 
understanding of the relationship between the institutional factors that potentially constrain or 
facilitate family formation and the selection factors that shape women’s outlooks on work and 
family. 
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 Table 1. Characteristics of fields of study of U.S. women graduates (from SIPP) and fields of study of women completing some U.S. 
college (from NLSY79), women born 1960–79 
  
Arts and 
humanities Education 
General 
studies 
Health 
sciences 
Private and 
public 
administration  
Science 
and 
technology  
Social 
sciences Overall 
2001, 2004, 2008 Survey of Income and Program 
Participation 
        Motherhood employment penalty  15.70   12.30   13.90   9.20   15.80   15.20   16.30  14.00 
  Per cent men  42.20   22.90   50.20   20.70   55.80   70.60   36.70  50.2 
Per cent of women married by 26  37.00   54.40   37.20   46.40   39.00   39.80   37.20  41.4 
1979 National Longitudinal Survey 
of Youth 
          Traditional family attitudes 1.92 1.98 1.88 1.98 1.92 1.86 1.85 1.92 
         Number of Observations (NLSY) 294 406 194 590 1200 534 354.0 3572 
Number of Observations (SIPP)  2,586   3,100   3,166   1,527   3,555   2,183   2,103   18,220  
Note: Motherhood employment penalty was calculated as the difference in labor force participation rates between women with children under the 
age of five and all other women in each field. Per cent men and motherhood employment penalty were calculated using 2001, 2004 and 2008 SIPP 
samples of college graduates aged 21–55. Attitudes from the NLSY79were measured in 1979, when individuals were 14–21 years old. 1982 
attitudes were used when 1979 values were missing. 
Source:  2001, 2004, and 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY79).  SIPP women aged 21–55 who had obtained at least a bachelor’s degree by SIPP interview. NLSY79 women aged 14–21 in 1979 who 
had completed at least some college course by the 2008 interview 
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 Table 2. Odds ratios of individual and field-of-study characteristics associated with having a first 
birth, from discrete-time event-history models, U.S. graduate women born 1960–79, aged 21–48 
  
M1: 
Demographics 
  
M2: Field 
characteristics 
  
M3: Full model 
  
Individual characteristics 
  
  
  Degree year 0.998 
 
0.998 
 
0.998 
 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 Race (White non-Hispanic reference group) 
      Black, non-Hispanic 0.957 
 
0.960 
 
0.963 
 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.058) 
 Hispanic 1.289 *** 1.290 *** 1.290 *** 
 
(0.105) 
 
(0.105) 
 
(0.105) 
 Age 20-24  0.207 *** 0.207 *** 0.207 *** 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 Age 25-29 0.652 *** 0.652 *** 0.652 *** 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.022) 
 Age 30-34 (reference) 
      
       Age 35-39 0.648 *** 0.647 *** 0.647 *** 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.037) 
 Age 40 and over 0.184 *** 0.184 *** 0.184 *** 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.026) 
 Field of study characteristics 
      Motherhood employment penalty 
  
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
   
(0.008) 
 
(0.006) 
 Per cent men 
  
0.974 *** 0.998 
 
   
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 Per cent men squared 
  
1.000 *** 1.000 
 
   
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 Per cent women married by age 26 
    
1.020 *** 
     
(0.004) 
 Traditional family attitudes (from NLSY79) 
  
1.058 ** 1.042 ** 
   
(0.025) 
 
(0.019) 
 Random effects intercepts 
      Field of study (standard deviation) (0.143) 
 
(0.078) 
 
(0.023) 
 
       
Wald Chi squared (df) 1123.9 
 
1142.75 
 
1239.91 
 Observations  79,664     79,664     79,664    
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 Note: Family attitudes are based on 6 questions in the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
about attitudes towards family roles. See text for description of questions. Scale runs from 1–4 with 
higher values indicating more traditional family role attitudes. Measure was then standardized for 
ease of interpretation. A one-unit increase in the traditional family role attitudes represents a one 
standard deviation increase in traditonal family role attitudes. 
Source: 2001, 2004 and 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation, sample of women 
graduates with no children at timely degree completion, born 1960–79. 
 
 *p < 0.10 **p <. 0.05 ***p  < 0.01 
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 Figure 1. Predicted probabilities of childlessness by field of study, derived from field-
specific discrete time event-history models of first birth, U.S. graduate women born 
1960–79  
   
Note: Separate, weighted models run for each field of study. Logit of first birth regressed on 
cubic function of age. 
 
Sources: 2001, 2004, and 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation, sample of 
women graduates with no children at timely degree completion.      
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Figure 2. Cumulative predicted probabilities of first birth for U.S. graduate women by 
age and field of study, derived from field-specific discrete time event-history models 
of first birth, U.S. graduate women born 1960–79  
 
 
 
Note: Separate, weighted models run for each field of study. Logit of first birth regressed on 
cubic function of age. 
 
Sources: 2001, 2004, and 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation, sample of 
women graduates with no children at timely degree completion. 
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Figure 3. Predicted probability of childlessness at age 44 for women, derived from 
Model 2, varying key field-level characteristics, U.S. graduate women born 1960–79  
 
 
Note: Estimates generated from Model 2 in Table 2. Field-level characteristics in turn set to 
their minimum, median, and maximum values while all other covariates held at their mean 
values. The minimum value for the traditional family attitudes variable reflects women with 
non-traditional attitudes towards family roles, so they exhibit higher levels of childlessness. 
This corresponds with our findings from Model 2 that suggest that higher values of the 
traditional family attitudes variables correspond to lower rates of childlessness. 
 
Source: 2001, 2004, and 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation, sample of women 
graduates with no children at timely degree completion. 
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